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State capitalism has been a basic tenet of the  sales without thorough preparation of the legal
developing strategy of the Turkish Republic for  ground. The sales wen! to foreigners, the highest
half a century, with import-substituting industri-  bidders, but this generated much controversy
alization through state economic enterprises  among unions, opposition parties, and industrial-
(SEEs) as a guiding principle.  But by 1980 a  ists.
serious economic and political crisis called for a
reassessment of economic policies. The policy  Privatization became a contentious political
reorientation was radical:  from import substitu-  issue that the opposition parties exploited, often
tion to export promotion, from interventionism  in a populist manner.  They got the block sales
to market forces, and from the promotion of  canceled by court orders - on the grounds that
SEEs to the promotion of the private sector.  the switch to foreign sales was illegal.
The state's role in the economy was to be  The government had not prepared the legal,
reduced. SEEs were to be streamlined and made  institutional, and political base for privatization.
more efficient by operating in a more competi-  It had no clear strategy and concrete program for
tive environment under greater cost and price  privatization and its assumption that
awareness. Greater efficiency would come from  privatization could be treated as an administra-
either SEE reform or privatization.  tive matter was proven wrong.  Much was said,
little done.  Excessive claims, withovt due
Apart from greater price flexibility and the  safeguards, generated a malaise among groups
dilution of some monopolies, SEE reforn  has  that privatization col!ld adversely affect.
not made much headway - mainly because the
government has been reluctant to adopt and  The cancelation of block sales coincided
pursue an effective reform program.  with a boom on the stock market. Moreover, the
treasury came under pressure to generate revenue
Emphasis has instead been put on  to contain a growing budget deficit. The sales
privatization broadly defined, with the additional  strategy thus switched back to stock market sales
objectives of developing the domestic capital  of minority shares. The share sales program has
markets and generating revenue for the treasury.  so far been a success, and the proceeds could
The initial operations were in the form of sales  finance a large part of the 1990 budget deficit.
of revenue-sharing bonds and minority share  At least for the moment, privatization has thus
sales. The first attempt at stock sales flopped,  shrunk to a budget-deficit financing technique,
because it took place in a falling market. The  with the loftier targets of enhanced efficiency
approach was then quietly switched to block  pushed into the background.
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AffairsComplex. Anobjectiveof theseries is to  get these fundings  outquickly, even if presentations are  less than fully  polished.
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ivI.  BACKGROUND
A.  Origin  of State  Capitalism
1.  Modern  Turkey  emerged  from  a costly  war  of  national  independence  in  1923
with  no firm  view  on the  respective  roles  in  the  economy  of the  private  and
public  sectors.  Infrastructure  was  in  public  hands,  but  much of the  rest  of
the  economy  remained  in  private  hands.  Most  of the  pra-war  entrepreneurs  had
belonged  to ethnic  and  religious  minorities  that  had  departed  as  a result  of
the  war.  The  national  class  of entrepreneurs  that  grew  to fill  the  void  was  a
major  source  of support  for  the  new  regime.  '.ocal  private  investors  tended
however  to  prefer  commerce  over  industry.  There  was  an absence  of foreign
investors,  who  anyway  were  viewed  with  suspicion  after  the  war  of  national
independence.  Th.e  economy  remained  predominantly  agrarian.
2.  The  Government  was  bound  in its  economic  policies  by various  trade
concessions  granted  to foreign  nations  (a  latter  day  version  of the
controversial  "capitulations"  that  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  granted  western
powers  since  1535).  The  1923  peace  treaty,  which  formally  ended  Turkey's  state
of  belligerency  in  World  War I,  stipulated  that  these  concessions  would
continue  until  1929.
3.  The  expiration  of the  trade  concessions  coincided  with  the  world
economic  crisis  in 1929.  Through  foreign  trade  the  domestic  economy  was  badly
affected.  The  national  entrepreneurs,  whose  performance  in industry  had  not
1been  all  that  impressive,  reeled  under  the  ensuing  recession.  Liberal  and
open-door  econcmic  policies  relying  on  market  forces  were  discredited.  Models
for  economic  development  strategies  were  being  sought  elsewhere.  Fascist  Italy
with  its  proclivity  for  a corporate  state  was  one  source  of inspiration.  So
was  the  Soviet  Union,  where  heavy  industrialization  through  five-year  plans
was  under  way.  Politically  republican  Turkey  had  little  sympathy  for  the
Soviet  Union,  but in  economic  matters  Turkey  was  willing  to  pick  and  choose  in
an eclectic  manner  without  ideological  blinds.
4.  The  concept  of state  capitalism!/  had  appealed  to  the  military  and
bureaucratic  leaders  of the  time,  since  they  had  grown  up under  a centralized
system  with  a certain  distrust  of private  entrepreneurs.  They  were  also
distrustful  of the  external  world,  but  at the  same  time  keen  to emulate  the
West  in  order  to strengthen  Turkey's  place  among  the  concert  of European
nations.  Thus  both  domestic  and  external  factors  prompted  Turkey  to  opt  for
state  capitalism.  It seemed  to  be the  only  practical  way  of  !rcoming  the
predicament  in  which  the  country  found  itself  at the  end  of the  1920s.
Pragmatism  rather  than  political  dogma  dictated  the  choice.  State  capitalism
was  chosen  after  some  soul-searching  and  as a  faute  de mieux.
I/  Under  state  capitalism,  as opposed  to  socialism,  the  state  assumes  a
leading  role in  industry  through  the  creation  of large  enterprises  that  are
designed  to  have a  multiplier  effect  on the  private  sector,  which  remains
dominant  in  agriculture  and  services.  A comprehensive  regulatory  framework  and
planning  (usually  indicative  for  the  private  sector)  are  used to  ensure  a
synergy  between  the  public  and  private  sectors,  Key  production  units  are  in
state  hands  not  because  of any  ideological  imperative,  but  as a practical
shortcut  to speed  up industrialization  (or  modernization)  against  the
background  of a  private  sector  assumed  to lack  the  means  or inclination  to
invest  in  large  modern  industrial  ventures.
25.  Under  the  state  capitalist  approach  chosen  by Turkey,  the  state  assumed
a leading  role  in the  mobilization  and  allocation  of resources.  The state  set
the  basic  parameters  for  the  private  sector.  A protective  trade  regime  was
adopted  in 1929  and  the  following  year  a Central  Bank  was  created.  Market
forces  were  frequently  tampered  with  through  interventionism.  State  directed
procurement,  rationing,  subsidies  and  incentives  spread.  The state  assumed  the
leading  role  in  heavy  industry  (iron  and  coal),  light  industry  (textiles)  and
transport.  Non-strategic  industrial  sectors,  commerce  and  agriculture  were
largely  left  to the  private  sector.  State-led  import  substituting
industrialization  become  the  guiding  principle  for  economic  planners.  In the
turbulent  1930s,  and  through  the  disruptions  caused  by World  War II,  this
strategy  had its  merits.
B.  Economic  Policies  and  Performance  1950-80
6.  During  the  postwar  decades  to 1980,  the  Turkish  economy  came  repeatedly
under  strain  as the  pace  of economic  change  quickened  arid  external  shocks
occurred,  while  both economic  policies  and  performance  were slow  to  adjust  to
changing  circumstances.  Each  decade  tended  to end  with  a balance  of payments
crisis  compounded  by a political  crisis.2/  Rapid  growth  was sustained  by
expansionary  fiscal  policies  coupled  with  accommodating  monetary  policies.  The
ensuing  inflation  tended  to  make  the  exchange  rate  overvalued,  which
undermined  the  balance  of  payments.  External  borrowing,  often  of a short-term
nature,  was  used to  close  the  current  account  deficits  and  postpone  the
2/  See  Peter  Wolf:  "Stabilization  Policy  and  Structural  Adjustment  in  Turkey,
1980-1985",  pages  46-60  (German  Development  Institute,  1987,  for  a summary  of
economic  developments  during  this  period.
3cutback  in excessive  domestic  demand.  Debt  service  rose.  Ultimately  the  debt
service  burden  became  unmanageable.  The  availability  of foreign  capital  dried
up.  Debt  had to  be rescheduled,  the  currency  devalued  and  .omestic  demand
curtailed.
7.  In terms  of economic  policies,  import-substituting  industrialization  was
pursued,  although  with  more scope  for  the  private  sector  after  the
introduction  of  multi-party  politics  in  the  late  1940s.  The  private  sector  had
become  increasingly  restive  within  the  straight-jacket  imposed  on it  by
comprehensive  state  intervention.  The state  relaxed  the  grip  a bit,  realizing
that it  could  also  benefit  from  giving  more  room  to the  private  sector.
Nonetheless  in substance  much  of the  guiding  role  of the  state  was  retained.
The  State  Planning  Organization  (SPO)  was created  in  1963  and indicative
planning,  of French  inspiration,  reinforced.  Its  aim  was to  guide  the
deployment  of public  resources  and  to induce  the  private  sectar  to comply  with
public  targets  and  priorities.
8.  The  ten  year "boom-bust"  cycle  of the  1970s  started  under  particularly
favorable  auspices,  but  ended  with  a serious  aconomic  crisis,  compounded  by
political  violence  and  paralysis.  In  1973  Turkey  registered  an  unprecedented
current  account  surplus  thanks  to large  workers'  remittances,  mainly  from  West
Germany.  By 1973  Turkey  had  however  become  very  dependent  on oil  imports  for
industry  and transport,  with  the  result  that  the  first  oil  shock  led  to
renewed  and  growing  current  account  deficits  starting  in  1974.
49.  The  policy  responsc  to the  oil  shock  was inadequate.  Weak  and  fractious
coalition  governments  tried  to spend  their  way  out  of the  adjustment  problem.
Both  public  expenditure  and  recourse  to central  bank  financing  were stepped
up.  Inflation  rose.  The  requisite  external  borrowing  became  increasingly
short-term  and  volatile.  When  Turkey  had to  default  on its  debt  service  in
late  1977,  it  was  faced  with  a full-blown  balance  of  payments  crisis.  Because
of political  uncertainties,  it  took  three  years  for  a package  of forceful
adjustment  policies  to  be adopted.  In  the  meaetime  inflation  rose  further,
foreign  exchange  became  increasingly  scarce,  while  extearnal  arrears
accumulated,  supplies  were  disrupted,  production  fell  and  unemployment  rose.
Turkey  had  reached  a crossroad  in Its  economic  development.
10.  Until  the  crisis  of the  late  1970s,  Turkey  had  pursued  both  a consistent
and  undifferentiated  import  substitution  policy.  Capital-intensive  state
economic  enterprises  (SEEs)  occupied  many  of the  commanding  heights  of the
economy. There  was  however  also  an increasingly  important  private  sector,
accounting  for  about  half  of industrial  output. The  emphasis  on import
substitution  over  export  promotion  had initially  yielded  impressive  results,
but  by the  1970s  most  of the  opportunities  for  successful  import  substitution
had  been  exhausted.  As import  substitution  moved  from  light  consumer  goods  to
intermediary  and  capital  goods,  the  benefits  to  the  economy  declined,  while
the  costs  rose.  Given  the  small  size  of the  domestic  market,  there  were few
economies  of scale  left  to  reap.  As a result,  it  was  diff.cult  to achieve  an
optimal  size  of firms.  This  was  reflected  in  rising  capital/output  ratios.
Moreover,  negative  real  interest  rates  were  conducive  to  excessive  capital
5intensity.  Few  jobs  were  created.2/ Little  foreign  exchange  was saved  as
production  became  more  import  dependent,  and  not  just  in  oil.  Protective
barriers  and  -an  overvalued  exchange  rate  precluded  competitive  exports.
11.  Even  without  the  balance  of payments  crisis  that  erupted  in 1977,  the
policy  of import  substitution  focussing  on SEEs  had run  its  course.  A major
policy  change  was  overdue.  In the  aggregate,  SEEs  became  increasingly
unprofitable  after  1974,  despite  various  implicit  subsidies,  not  least  of
which  were subsidized  interest  rates.  In  addition  to internal  inefficiencies,
a  major  reason  for  their  poor  financial  performance  was that  prices  for  their
output  were  not  allowed  to rise  in  line  with  cost  in the  increasingly
inflationary  environment  then  prevailing.  Rather  than  Deipr  engines  of growth
as  hoped  for  by the  planners,  SEEs  had on the  whole  become  brakes  on growth  by
the  late  1970s.
C.  Macroeconomic  Performance  in  the  1980s
12.  In 1980  the  Turkish  Government  finally  decided  that  a drastic  policy
reorientation  to  cope  with the  multi-faceted  crisis  was  needed.  It is
noteworthy  that  the  economic  reform  program  was  adopted  by a civilian
government  eight  months  before  the  military  take-over  in  September  1980.  lhe
military  Government  that  followed  endorsed  the  economic  reform  program,  while
limiting  political  activities,  such  as disbanding  Parliament  and  banning
2/  SEEs  possessed  a small  but  highly  unionized  (and  well  paid)  labor  force
that  constituted  a  veritable  labor  aristocracy  (Caglar  Keyder:  "State  and
Class  in  Turkey:  A Study  in  Capitalist  Development",  pages  160-61,  Verso,
1987).
6political  parties,  unions  a.ad  strikes.  Both  in  economic  and  political  terms,
1980  was  a turning  point.
13.  The  gravity  of the  economic  crisis  forced  the  Government  to critically
re-examine  many  of its  past  basic  policy  premises.  New  courses  were explored
and  old  shibboleths  jettisoned.  In  1980  Turkey  radically  broke  with  the  thrust
of economic  policies  pursued  since  the  inception  of the  Republic  by switching
from  inward  orieni.3d  import  substitution  to  outward  oriented  export  promotion.
On the  domestic  side,  there  was  a concomitant  shift  from  interventionism  to
reliance  on market  forces,  combined  with  a reduced  role  for  the  public  sector
and  promotion  of the  private  sector.  An encompassing  liberalization  of  the
economy  was  attempted  to overcome  the  crisis  and  restore  rapid  growth  in  a
non-inflationary  context  of enhanced  international  competitiveness.
14.  The instruments  used to  realize  the  new  policy  objectives  were also  out
of the  ordinary:  a  massive  devaluation  follcwed  by  a crawling  peg  plus  step-
wise  import  liberalization  and  a broad  array  of export  incentives.  On the
domestic  side,  use  was  made  of fiscal  and  monetary  tightening,  including
positive  real interest  rates,  freeing  of prices  end  removal  of state
monopolies.  Relative  prices  were  shifted  in  favor  of tradables,  while  domestic
demand  was  restrained,  including  throrgh  an erosion  of real  wages.
15.  Impressive  results  were  speedily  achieved  as shown  in  Table  1  below.
Between  1980  and  1984  negative  growth  had  been  turned  into  high  positive
growth.
7Table 1. Summary Macroeconomic Indicators,  1980-89
1980  1984  1989
Real GNP growth rate (percent)  -1.1  6.0  1.7
Resource gap, minus-surplus (in  5.5  2.8  -0.9
percent of GNP)
Average annual change in wholesale  90.3  50.3  69.6
price index (percent)
Public sector borrowing requirement,  10.3  6.5  5.6 1/
PSBR, (in percent of GNP)
Annual growth in broad money  66.3  58.0  73.3
(percent)
In percent of GNP
Exports (fob)  5.0  14.7  14.6
Imports (fob)  12.9  20.6  19.9
Trade balance  -7.9  -5.9  -5.2
Current account balance  -5.8  -2.9  1.2
Non-interest current account balance  -3.9  0.3  4.8
In billions of US Dollars
Debt outstanding and disbursed  16.3  20.7  41.0
Debt service  1.0  4.0  7.2
Debt over GNP  (percent)  27.9  41.2  51.0
Debt over exports (percent)  443.9  210.2  216.4
Debt service ratio 2/ (percent)  27.8  41.1  37.8
Source  Statistical Appendix, Tables 1-2
1/ Likely to be revised upward to around 6.0 percent when
final  results  of  SEEs  become  available.
2/  Debt  service  over  exports  of  goods  and  services  plus  workers'
remittances.
The  shift  to tradables  meant  that  the  resource  gap  was  cut  in  half.  The  public
sector  borrowing  requirement  (PSBR)  was  also  cut  significantly.  So was
inflation,  although  less  success  was  achieved  in  reducing  the  growth  in  money
supply.  The  most conspicuous  progress  was in  terms  of exports,  whose  share  of
GNP  nearly  tripled  to  14.7  percent.  Sluggish  domestic  demand  and  booming
demand  in  oil-exporting  Middle  Eastern  countries  were  the  main  reasons  in
addition  to the  change  in  relative  prices. Exports  to  OECD  countries  also
increased  rapidly.
16.  The  rapid  increase  in  exports  permitted  both  a sizable  increase  in
imports  and  a  major  reduction  in  the  trade  and  current  account  deficits.  By
1984  a small  non-interest  current  account  surplus  had  even  emerged.  In  the
8wake  of debt  reschedulings,  and  resumed  debt  service,  debt  service  payments
rose  however  rapidly,  with  the  result  that  the  debt  service  ratio  rose  from  28
to 41  percent  between  1980  and  1984.  Capital  losses  on the  external  debt
through  real  depreciations  of the  exchange  rate  meant  that  the  debt  to  GNP
ratio  also increased  from  28 to 41  percent.
17.  In  contrast  to  the  success  of the  first  half  of the  1980s,  the  second
half  of the  decade  has  been  characterized  by  marking  time.  Table  1 again
presents  a summary  picture.  Growth  slowed  and inflation  rose.  Further  progress
in reducing  the  PSBR  proved  difficult.  Restraining  the  growth  in  money  supply
turned  out  to  be elusive.  On the  external  side,  no further  progress  was  made
in terms  of the  relative  size  of foreign  trade.  A current  account  surplus  did
however  emerge  thanks  to  higher  service  receipts,  mainly  from  tourism  (in
addition,  a recession  depressed  import  demand  in 1989).  The  external  debt
nearly  doubled  to $41  billion,  but  this  was  largely  due  to cross-currency
movements  (especially  the  weakening  of the  dollar).  The  debt  to  GNP  ratio  rose
much  less,  to 51  percent.  Growing  foreign  excnange  receipts  under  the  current
account  balance  led  to a decline  in  the  debt  service  ratio  to 38  percent,
despite  a large  increase  in debt  service  payments.
18.  By  the  end  of the  1980s  a strong  external  performance  co-existed  with  a
domestic  performance  that  continued  to  display  structural  weaknesses.  The  most
salient  structural  weakness  has  been  the  inability  of the  public  sector  to
live  within  its  own  means.  One  manifestation  of this  phenomenon  is  that  the
size  of the  public  sector  in the  economy,  which  was  reduced  between  1980  and
1984  iTn  line  with  the  enunciated  policy,  has, if  anything,  tended  to  rise
9after  1984,  as sho-in  in  Graph  1. It  has  been  difficult  to change  the  modus
operandi  of the  public  sector  and  to  reduce  the  deficit.  Moreover,  the
Government  has found  it  difficult  to  submit  itself  to the  discipline  of  market
forces.  When  under  pressure,  the  atavistic  reaction  of the  Government  is often
to resort  to interventionism.
19.  The  public  sector  has  appropriated  a large  share  of domestic  private
savings,  more  through  borrowing  than  through  the  inflation  tax.  This  has
pulled  up interest  rates  and  entrenched  inflationary  expectations.  Private
investment  in  manufacturing  has  been  sluggish,  thereby  undercutting  the
sustainability  of the  export  drive.  Planning  horizons  have shortened,  as  the
credibility  of government  policies  has diminished,  allegedly  due  to  numerous
and  unpredictable  policy  adjustments  for  short-term  political  gain.
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D.  Dissatisfaction  with  SEE  Performance
20.  By  1980  the  poor  performance  of  SEEs  had  become  all  too  visible.  Of  a
PSBR of  10.3  percent  of  GNP in  that  year,  SEEs  accounted  for  6.4  percentage
points,  that  is  nearly  two  thirds.  Part  of  the  poor  performance  stemmed  from
internal  inefficiency,  but  a  large  part  was  also  caused  by  government-imposed
constraints,  such  as  frozen  prices,  overstaffing  and  politically  motivated
managerial  appointments.  Perceiving  SEEs  more  as  a  drag  than  a  dynamo  for  the
11economy,  in its  economic  reform  program  the  Government  stressed  the  need for
improved  performance  of SEEs,  including  the  shedding  of SEEs  through
privatization  and  liquidations.  Improving  the  performance  of SEEs  has  however
turned  out  to be a difficult  task.  After  a good  start,  further  progress  has
been  harder  to  come  by.A/
21.  Between  1980  and 1984  the  financial  performance  of SEEs  improved
significantly,  as shown  in  Table  2.  The  PSBR  of SEEs  declined  to 2.3  percent
of GNP (barely  a third  of the  total  PSBR).  A  major  explanation  was  the
opportunity  given  to  SEEs  in 1980  to  raise  prices  to  compensate  for  the
erosion  in  relative  sales  prices  since  1973.  Some  prices  were  henceforth  freed
altogether,  but  most  remained  subject  to de facto  ministerial  approval.
Another  explanation  for  the  lower  PSBR  was  the  reduction  in the  share  of  SEEs
in  total  public  investment  (the  latter  remained  a relatively  stable  portion  of
GNP  throughout  the  1980s),  as depicted  in  Graph  2.  A lower  PSBR  also  meant
that  the  share  of SEEs in  outstanding  bank  credit  could  be reduced  from  33
percent  in  198C  to 12  percent  in  1984.
22.  After  1984  there  was  no further  visible  improvement  in  the  performance
of  SEEs.  Their  PSBR  barely  changed  between  1984  and  1989,  whereas  their  profit
margin  shrunk  from  7.5  to 1.7  percent.  Sales  per  worker  declined  by about  5
percent  in  real  terms.  SEE  investment  was slashed  significantly,  but  was
offset  by  higher  interest  payments,  in  part  due  to  upward  pressure  on interest
rates  exerted  through  stepped  up borrowing  by the  Central  Government.  In 1984
A/  See  Luc  Everaert:  "Turkey  SEEs"  (unpublished  World  Bank  paper,  1989)  for
an analysis  of the  performance  of SEEs  in the  1980s.
12SEEs  benefitted  from  a reduction  in interest  payments,  when  part  of their  debt
to the  Central  Bank  was  consolidated  and  assumed  by the  Treasury. Following
an erosion  in  real  wages  through  most  of the  1980s,  in 1989  wage  payments  rose
sharply  following  a framework  agreement  with  the  unions  stipulating  a 143
percent  wage increase  (compared  to  an annual  inflation  rate  of 70  percent).  No
further  increase  in  relative  sales  prices  was  realized.  But  sales  prices  were
in the  short  run  manipulated  for  political  purposes,  as  highlighted  in  Graph
3. Before  elections,  SEE  price  increases  were  allowed  to
Ttble 2. Indicators of SEE Performance, 1980-89
1980  1984  1989
SEE PSBR (percent of GNP)  6.4  2.3  2.4
Total PSBR (percent of GNP)  10.3  6.5  5.6
Share of SEE PSBR (percent of total)  62.3  35.4  42.9
SEE share in total public investment  66.6  51.9  41.5
(percent)
SEE share in outstanding bank credit  33.0  11.5  14.2
(percent)
Profit margin  1/  (percent)  ..  7.5  1.7
Share of wages and salaries in total  ..  11.8  14.7
current expenditure  (percent)
Sales per worker  (in millions of TL  ..  38.0  36.4
at 1988 prices)
In  percent of GNP
Financing  requirements  ..  8.6  6.0
Internally generated funds  ..  3.5  2.7
Transfers from the budget  and extra  ..  2.5  0.9
budgetary  funds
Other  2/  ..  2.7  2.4
Source  :  Statistical  Appendix,  Tables  3-7
1/  Operating  surplus/sales  of  goods  and  services.
2/  Defe,red  payments,  change  in  cash  balances  and  borrowing
(domestic  and  external).
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14lag  private  sector  price  increases,  with a speedy  recuperation  immediately
after  elections.  This  pattern  vitiates  the  claim  that  market  forces
increasingly  deternine  SEE  price  policy.  The  short-term  manipulation  of SEE
prices  does  however  not  necessarily  lead  to  distortion  over  the  medium  term,
because  over  the  1987 - May 1990  period,  the  terms  of trade  between  public  and
private  sector  prices  remained  unchanged.
23.  Because  of a cutback  in investment,  the  financing  requirement  of SEEs,
as shown  in  Table  2, declined  from  8.6  percent  of  GNP in  1984  to 6.0  percent
in  1989.  Most  of the  decline  was  reflected  in  lower  transfers  from  the  budget
and  extra-budgetary  funds.  SEEs  have thus  become  less  of a  burden  on the
budget.  When  a  variety  of implicit  subsidies  are  included,  it is clear  that  in
financial  terms  the  performance  of SEEs  has  continued  to  improve.  Implicit
subsidies  are  estimated,  with  a considerable  margin  of  error  due  to data
limitations,  to  have  fallen  from  11  percent  of GNP  in 1984  to 2  percent  in
1990.5/
24.  SEEs  still  constitute  a major  block  of the  economy.  Their  share  of total
value  added  (GDP  at factor  cost)  has  hovered  around  10  pe cent.  The  share  of
the  31 largest  SEEs  in  the  civilian  labor  force  has  remained  at 4  percent
since  1984.  Reducing  overstaffing  in  SEEs  has  met  with  only  limited  success.
The  initial  enthusiasm  for  SEE  reform  began  to  wear  off  when the  Government
discovered  what important  bastions  of vested  labor  interest  SEEs  constituted,
j/  Luc  Everaert,  op.  cit.  Implicit  subsidies  comprise  capital  transfers,  aid,
imputed  duty  losses,  imputed  interest  subsidies  (the  major  component)  and
foregone  dividends.
15and  how  handy  it  could  be to  prov'de  the  ?arty  faithful  with  sinecures  in
SEEs.  A concerted  attempt  to  alter  the  modus  operandi  of SEEs  was  never  made.
As a result,  the  SEEs  continued  to  be afflicted  by the  common  problems  of
overstaffing,  political  interference  and  multiplicity  of  objectives  detracting
from  efficient  commercial  operations.
25.  The  conclusion  is that  streamlining  the  size  of  the sector  and  improving
the  performance  of the  SEEs  were consistently  put  forward  as goals,  but  were
not  sufficiently  implemented  in the  structural  adjustment  policies  pursued  by
the  Turkish  Government  since  1980.  SEEs  resisted  being  dethroned  from  their
previously  leading  and  privileged  position.  The  entrenched  interests  profiting
from  the  SEE  status  quo  were  and  are  well  organized  and  vocal.  SEEs  are
falling  behind  in  the  modernization  of the  economy.  They  are  thereby  remaining
a burden,  which  is difficult  to  remove.  Coping  with the  problems  caused  by
SEEs  by starving  them  of resources  and  running  down  their  investment  budget
may  be a feasible  solution,J/ )ut  it  is  unlikely  to  be a  very efficient
solution,  including  in  terms  of preparing  SEEs  for  privatization.
E.  Strategic  Options  for  Improving  SEE Performance:  Reforms  and
Privatization
26.  The  need  to  persist  with  efforts  to  improve  the  performance  of  SEEs  is
beyond  argument.  The  prime  issue  is  how  to improve  productivity,  rather  than
merely  paper  over inefficiencies  by exploiting  monopoly  or oligopoly  power
§/  Or to  paraphrase  a  worn  aphorism:  Old  SEEs  never  die,  they  only  fade  away.
16through  price  increases.  There  are  basically  two  options  available:  either
keep  the  SEEs  in the  public  sector  but subject  them  to far-reaching  reforms
(including  liquidations  where  appropriate),  or transfer  them  to the  private
sector  through  various  forms  of privatization.  Here  the  focus  will  be on the
reform  option:  privatization  is  the  topic  of the  remainder  of this  paper.
27.  Against  a background  of improving  the  overall  efficiency  of the  economy,
with  respect  to SEEs  the  announced  reform  objectives  of the  Government  were
to:  a) reduce  the  size  of the  SEE  sector  in the  economy;  b) reduce  the
monopoly  power  of SEEs;  c)  gradually  eliminate  the  burden  of SEEs  on the
budget;  d) reorganize  SEEs,  including  management,  to  make  them  more  profit  and
cost  conscious,  thereby  strengthening  competitiveness.  Various  measures  were
adopted  to these  ends.  Price  rigidities  were  reduced.  The  regulatory  framework
was  reformed,  but  the  net  effect  does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  major
reduction  in  administrative  control.  By  cutting  investment,  budget  transfers
could  be lowered.  State  monopolies  in sugar,  tea,  tobacco,  alcoholic  beverages
and  fertilizers  were  rescinded  in  1984.  Appointment  of SEE  managers  was  opened
up to  private  sector  expertise  and  no longer  confined  to the  civil  service.
SEE  managers  were  given  greater  latitude  in  recruiting  contract  staff  that
could  be paid  competitive  salaries  outside  the  civil  service  salary  scale.
28.  On the  whole,  the  measures  did  not  amount  to the  requisite  sweeping
reform.  With the  partial  exception  of the  objective  of reducing  SEE  monopoly
power,  the  objectives  remained  unfulfilled.  The  measures  adopted  tended  to  be
delayed  and diluted  versions  of the  proclaimed  intentions.  Moreover,  the
implementation  was generally  lacking  in  vigor.  The  management  of SEEs,
17supported  by various  vested  interest  groups,  was  successful  in  blunting  the
reforms.  Resistance  to  reforms  was  made  easier  by the  lack  of conviction  with
which  the  bureaucracy  was  executing  the  reform  measures  adopted.
29.  A major  weakness  in the  implementation  of structural  adjustment  policies
in  Turkey  during  the  1980s  has  been  that  the  new  policies  have  been  handed
down  from  above  for  implementation  to a  bureaucracy  that  in  many  ways remains
wedded  to the  old  policies  (which  gave it  more influence  over  economic
matters).  The  resistance  (sometimes  even  obstructionism)  of the  bureaucracy
has  not  been  diminished  by declining  real  wages  for  many  of its  members  in the
1980s;  the  bureaucracy  figures  prominently  among  the  "losers"  from  structural
adjustment.  Compared  to  private  sector  professionals,  the  bureaucracy  has  lost
heavily,  both in  pecuniary  and  status  terms.
30.  Since  the  Government  remains  preoccupied  with  the  low  productivity  of
SEEs,  in  1990  it  has  been  preparing  a  new  Code (or  law)  for  SEEs.  The
Government  is  concerned  with  the  impact  of SEE  pricing  on inflation,  and  their
continuing  borrowing  for  public  finances,  as well  as  the  disruptive  impact  on
output  and  employment  from  continuing  investment  cutbacks.  Ensuring
competitive  productiozi  and  output  pricing  is  also  an issue,  since  the  output
of  many SEEs  is  the  input  of  private  sector  firms,  several  of  which  are
nowadays  export  oriented.
31.  In  order  to  prevent  periodic  bursts  of inflation  due  to  delayed  and
large  price  increases  of SEEs  (for  political  reasons),  their  price  increases
are  scheduled  to be smaller,  but  at  more  regular  intervals  from IW"0.  Closer
18government  scrutiny  would  reduce  the  scope  for  using  price  increases  to  paper
over  poor  efficiency.  The  draft  SEE  Code  envisages  placing  most  SEEs  on a
commercial  footing  and  to  convert  them  into  joint  stock  companies.  Thib  could
make  it easier  to increase  the  autonomy  of management  and  to attract  private
partners  into  joint  ventures.  Conversely,  the  Code  does  little  to  reduce  the
scope  for  political  intervention;  for  instance  the  Government  will  continue  to
appoint  civil  servants  to the  Board,  thus  leaving  the  scope  for  political
interference  unchanged.  By  restricting  the  access  of  SEEs  to public  funds  ar.d
by insisting  on external  audits,  it is  hoped  to stimulate  greater  efficiency.
Closer  monitoring  of SEE  financial  performance  is  also  foreseen  for  1990.
Their  individual  investment  and  financial  programs  are  to  be examined  monthly
by the  concerned  government  agencies  to  make  sure  that  the  targeted  numbers
are  not  exceeded,  debts  paid  on time  and  price  increases  warranted.
32.  The  critical  issue  is  how implementable  the  preceding  proposals  are.
Authority  over  SEE  matters  is scattered  among  several  government  ministries
and  agencies.  Ingrained  operating  procedures  and  a  more  vocal  labor  force,  as
shown  by higher  wage increases,  will  require  skillful  design  and sequencing  of
reforms.  Nor  will  it  be easy  to  strike  an appropriate  balance  between  market
based  incentives  and  administrative  control  (controls  by themselves  are
usually  of little  avail  and  often  make  things  worse).  In the  meantime,  and
with  emphasis  placed  on privatization  rather  than  improved  SEE  productivity,
investment  in  SEEs  has  been  allowed  to  dwindle.  As a result,  their
productivity  has  declined  further,  thus  rendering  their  privatization  more
difficult.
19II.  PRIVATIZATION  IN  TURKEY
A.  Initial  Strategy
33.  Privatization  has  been  a  much  publicized  component  of the  Government's
panoply  of structural  adjustment  policies  in  the  1980s.  Given  the  prominent
role  of SEEs  in  the  economy,  and  their  often  mediocre  performance,  as
documented  in the  preceding  section,  policies  to improve  their  efficiency  and
financial  results  were  crucial  in  achieving  a structural  transformation  and
modernization  of the  economy.  The  two  major  instruments  used to this  effect
were  SEE  reform  and  privatization.  As noted,  the  results  of attempts  to reform
the  SEEs  that  are  to  remain  part  of the  public  sector  have so  far  yielded
inconclusive  results.  The  purpose  of this  section  is  to  analyze  the  experience
with  the  SEEs  that  are  to  be transferred  from  the  public  to the  private  sector
through  privatization.
34.  The initial  privatization  strategy  formulated  in 1984  aimed  at
increasing  the  efficiency  of  SEEs  through  sales  to  the  private  sector  and  in
the  process  to promote  a  market  economy.  Privatization  was intended  to  become
a  major  component  of the  overall  liberalization  of the  economy.  The  period  of
a leading  role  for  the  state  in  the  development  of industry  (and  sometimes
even  services,  such  as  banking)  was  seen  as drawing  to  a close,  with  the
private  sector  ready  to take  over  the  ground  vacated.  Tne  public  sector  would
thereby  be able  to concentrate  on the  provision  of infrastructure.  The  Turkish
Government  was  influenced  by the  winds  of economic  neo-liberalism  that  were
20sweeping  the industrialized  West in  the  1980s,  most  visibly  in  Thatcher's
England  and  Reagan's  United  States.
35.  In  addition  to  the  avowed  overall,  and  in  part ideologically  motivated
objective,  there  were  several  more  concrete  objectives  behind  the
privatization  strategy.  Privatization  was  seen  as a means  to  reduce  the  burden
of SEEs  on the  economy  and  the  budget.  Thereby  a more  efficient  allocation  of
resources  would  be promoted,  including  the  distribution  of credit,  and  a
lowering  of the  budget  deficit  facilitated.  Inflation  abatement  would  become
less  difficult  and  inputs  to  export-oriented  private  firms  more  competitively
priced.
36.  By  means  of  privatization,  it  was thought  that  productive  efficiency
would  be improved  in  the  short-term  through  better  use  of existing  resources
by private  owners/managers,  while  over  time  allocative  efficiency  would  also
be improved  by rendering  the  privatized  plants  more  responsive  to shifts  in
demand  and  relative  prices.  By  removing,  through  privatization,  the  numerous
privileges,  explicit  and  implicit,  that  SEEs  had  benefitted  from,  a more
competitive  and  less  distortionary  economic  environment  would  be created.
Although  Turkish  state  capitalism  differs  in  many  ways  from  the  socialism
until  recently  practiced  in  Eastern  Europe,  Turkish  SEEs  have  also  benefitted
extensively  from  the  "soft  budget  constraint",  that  is  the  ability  to stretch
the  budget  constraint  through  adjustments  in  prices,  subsidies,  taxes  plus
credit  availability  and  cost.  j/
J/  For  a summary  presentation  of the  various  aspects  of the  "soft  budget
constraint",  see  The  Economist,  April  28,  1990,  A Survey  of Perestroika,  page
14.
2137.  Through  privatization  capitalism  was to  be broght to the  people.  The
population  at large  was to  be given  a stake  in  former  SEEs,  which  were  often
considered  part  of the  national  patrimony.  Ownership  was to  be spread  widely
through  share  sales,  at  market  determined  prices  on the  stock  exchange,
auctions  or a similar  mechanism. Private  management  would  take  over  and
enhance  efficiency.  By offering  shares  to a  broad  public,  dormant  private
savings  would  be mobilized.  Private  savings  would  be diverted  from  inflation
hedges  like  gold,  real  estate,  consumer  durables  (most  conspicuously  luxury
cars)  and  even  foreign  exchange,  inter  alia  through  capital  flight,  and  put  to
more  productive  use in  the  national  economy.!/
38.  In 1986  the  inter-ministerial  High  Planning  Board  (HPB),  chaired  by the
Prime  Minister,  and  the  highest  formal  authority  on general  economic  policy
issues,  decided  the  target  groups  of share  sales:  employees,  local  small-
scale  investors,  Turkish  workers  abroad  and investors  at the  Istanbul  Stock
Exchange  (ISE)  in  small  lots.  There  was  a populist  streak  in this  approach.
While  foreigners  were  not  a  priori  to  be excluded,  they  were  not  a target
group,  reflecting  the  latent  exceptionally  strong  nationalism  of Turkish
society.
39.  Share  sales  to  broad  strata  of the  population  were  also  seen  as a  means
of promoting  the  eubrvonic  capital  market.  In  parallel,  new actors  and
8j  The  Government's  privatization  philosophy  has  been  spelled  out in  various
documents,  including:  Cengiz  Israfil,  The  Privatization  Program  in  Turkey;
paper  presented  at the  National  Meeting  on  Turkey,  World  Economic  Forum,
Istanbul,  1987.
22instruments  were  expected  to emerge,  such  as  mutual  funds  and short-term
commercial  paper.  Adherence  to stock  market  regulations  in  terms  of
standardized  financial  reporting,  external  audits  and  disclosure  requirements
would  increase  investor  confidence  and  exert  pressure  on private  firms  not  yet
quoted  on the  stock  excharge  to follow  suit.  In  addition,  subsequent  share
sales  in  a growing  stock  anarket  could  secure  a capital  infusion  to the
enterprises.  These  had in some  cases  become  undercapitalized  through  the
accumulation  of past  losses.
40.  Privatization  was  also  meant  to yield  the  usually  adduced  benefits  of
improved  management,  state-of-the-art  technology  and  easier  access  to foreign
markets  in  cases  where  an export-oriented  enterprise  was sold  to foreigners.
To reap  these  benefits,  which  are  difficult  to quantify,  artful  negotiations
with  potential  buyers  would  be  needed,  since  these  would  not  provide  the
benefits  free  of charge,  nor  assess  their  value  objectively.  They  would  demand
a discounted  sales  price  in  return.  In  these  circumstance,  mere share  sales
would  not suffice;  a specific  privatization  agreement  would  have to  be
negotiated.
41.  Selling  SEEs  to  major  foreign  firms  (neither  explicitly  mentioned,  nor
excluded)  could  foster  bilateral  economic  relations,  thereby  making  Turkey  a
more  valuable  partner  for  the  home  country  of the  foreign  buyer.  The  creation
of  mutual  economic  ties  would  reinforce  the  irreversibility  of the  opening  up
of the  economy.  It  might  even,  indirectly  and  over  time,  facilitate  the
adhesion  of Turkey  to  the  European  Community,  while  developing  special
commercial  ties  with  Japan  and  the  US.
2342.  Unlike  Eastern  Europe,  there  were  never  in  Turkey  any ideological  hang-
ups  about  transferring  ownership  of public  assets  through  privatization,
although  old-fashioned  bureaucrats  probably  regretted  the  shrunken  role
envisaged  for  the  public  sector  and  the  concomitant  reduction  in  their  sway
over  the  economy.  On the  contrary,  the  official  line  was that  both  ownership
and  management  of  hitherto  state  firms  had to  be transferred  to  the  private
sector  to enhance  efficiency  and international  competitiveness.  State
capitalism  was to  be disbanded,  because  it  had  outlived  its  usefulness.i./  The
approach  was thus  pragmatic  and  dictated  by efficiency  criteria.  Another
important  difference  with  Eastern  Europe  was  that  self-managed  firms  were
never  considered  a serious  option  in  Turkey.  The  transformation  was to  be
directly  from  state  capitalism  to  private  capitalism  with  no detour  via  more
or less  woolly  "third  ways".
43.  In  the  initial  strategy,  the  revenue  that  could  accrue  to the  budget
from  the  privatization  of SEEs  was  not  mentioned  as a  major  objective.
Precedence  was instead  given  to efficiency  criteria  and  widening  of private
ownership.  Nonetheless,  the  additional  revenue  that  privatization  could
generate  for  a hard-pressed  budget  was  probably  not  altogether  absent  from  the
minds  of the  framers  of the  privatization  strategy.
9j  In reality  there  were  however  also  movements  in the  opposite  direction,
i.e.  the  State  taking  over  bankrupt  private  firms  in 1986.
24B.  Preparations
44.  Privatization  was slow  in  getting  under  way, despite  the  proclaimed
strong  political  support  from  the  highest  echelons  of the  Government.  The
first  publicized  attempt  at  privatization  took  place  in 1984,  but  was  not  a
genuine  privatization.  It consisted  of the  sales  of  revenue  sharing
certificates  to the  general  public.  The  state  retained  ownership  to the  assets
and  full  operating  control,  but  borrowed,  through  the sales  of the
certificates,  against  the  future  revenue  of the  assets.  The  equivalent  of 34
percent  of the  revenue  of the  (first)  Bosphorus  bridge  and  22 percent  of the
revenue  of the  Keban  dam  were sold.  The  bridge  certificates  were
oversubscribed  and fully  sold  out in  less  than  three  hours  to around  15,000
local  investors.  The  yields  on the  certificates  turned  out  to be  very
competitive,  in  particular  for  the  bridge,  since  the  Government  had  under-
estimated  traffic  growth  and  the  revenue  shares  were  fixed  regardless  of total
revenue.  The  certificates  were in  maturities  of two  to three  years  and  have
since  been  refinanced  without  difficulty.
45.  For  the  next step  in the  privatization  process  the  Government  solicited
the  assistance  of the  World  Bank.  Agreement  was  reached  to  focus  on SEEs  in
three  major  sectors  (cement,  fertilizer  and  textiles)  as well  as on the
elaboration  of an overall  strategy.  In  June  1985  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  was
charged  with  preparing  a  Privatization  Master  Plan  to this  effect.LO/  The
Master  Plan  was submitted  in  mid-1986.  It  was  however  never  implemented.  The
1/J  See  Roger  Leeds,  Turkey:  "Implementation  of a Privatization  Strategy",
Harvard  University,  Center  for  Business  and  Government,  1987,  for  an
assessment  of the  Master  Plan  approach  and  the  role  of the  World  Bank  therein.
25Government  felt  that  the  Plan  had  been  prepared  without  due  recognition  of
local  realities,  mainly  of a political  and  technical  nature,  and  that
therefore  it  was  not  implementable.  Shortage  of government  staff  made  it
unfeasible  to  revamp  the  Plan  into  an operational  document  in the  local
context.  The  Master  Plan  approach  ultimately  led  nowhere,  but  at least
attempted  a strategic  approach  to the  privatization  process,  something  that
subsequently  was  to prove  wanting.
46.  In parallel,  the  regulatory  and institutional  framework  for
privatization  was  gradually  put  in  yl.ace.  In 1984  Decree-Law  233  was  adopted
with  the  aim  of consolidating  administrative  control  over  the  SEEs.  Of greater
relevance  here,  the  Decree-Law  also  contained  provisions  to  expedite
privatization.  Of particular  relevance  was the  power  granted  to  the  Council  of
Ministers  to decide  on  privatization  of SEEs  without  prior  approval  by
Parliament.  This  administrative  shortcut  appeared  justified,  since  the
Government  could  rely  on  a large,  and  pliant,  majority  in Parliament.  By
turning  privatization  into  an essentially  administrative  matter,  the
possibility  of building  a political  consensus  around  privatization  was  however
correspondingly  reduced.
47.  Further  provisions  for  the  implementation  of SEE  privatization  were
contained  in  Law  3291  of 1986.  The  law  specified  that  once  the  HPB  had  decided
on the  privatization  of an SEE,  on behalf  of the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  SEE
were  to  become  a separate  legal  entity  and  to be transferred  to the  Mass
Housing  and  Public  Participation  Administration  (MHPPA),  in  whose  ward  the  SEE
would  remain  until  it  had  been  privatized.  The  transfer  of SEEs  to  MHPPA  has
26legal  ambiguities.  The  SEEs  continue  to  have  masters  other  than  the  MHPPA,
such  as their  old  technical  ministry,  the  Ministry  of Finance  and  Customs  and
the  High  Audit  Board  attached  to  the  President's  office.
48.  With  the  basic  regulation  in  place  and  the  impiementing  institution
designated,  the  Government  was  ready  to  proceed  with specific  privatization
cases.  But  before  that,  the  major  objectives  of  privatization  were  reiterated.
In  an address  to the  World  Economic  Forum  meeting  of leading  international
businessmen,  officials  and  academicians  in Istanbul  in  May  1987,  the  senior
government  official  in  charge  of privatization  announced  (without  a timetable)
the  key  objectives  to be:l1/
a) Transfer  of the  decision  making  process  in  almost  half  of the  economy
from  the  public  sector  to  the  private  sector  to make  the  economy  more
responsive  to  market  forces;
b) Develop  a viable  capital  market  by transferring  passive  savings  into
active  investments  in  the  capital  market;
c) Reduce  the  burden  of the  SEEs  on the  Government;
d)  As the  lowest  ranked  objective,  raise  revenue  for  the  Treasury.
ll/  Cengiz  Israfil,  op.cit.
27C.  Initial  Test  Cases
49.  In  accordance  with  the  regulation,  the  initial  genuine  test  cases  of
privatization  in  1988  were  assigned  to the  MHPPA.  Originally  an Extra-
Budgetary  Fund (EBF)  in  charge  of certain  public  infrastructure  investments
and  the  related  revenue  sharing  certificates,  the  Fund  has since  grown  to
encompass  a  Mass  Housing  Department  and later  a Privatization  Department.  The
staffing  of the  latter  has  remained  small  and,  like  the  MHPPA  as a  whole,
somewhat  outside  the  administrative  and  political  mainstream.  In  preparing  for
and  negotiating  privatization  agreements,  MHPPA  has  had to  call  on external
expertise,  often  foreign  and  at considerable  cost.  As a consequence  of the
debacle  with  the  Morgan-sponsored  Master  Plan,  the  recourse  to foreign  advice
has  been  criticized.
50.  The  first  test  case  of privatization  was the  divestiture  of the  state's
minority  shares  in  the  Teletas  communications  company  in  February  1988.  The
shares  were sold  in  small  individual  lots  through  branches  of selected
commercial  banks  and  subsequently  traded  on the  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange  (ISE).
All  the  shares  available  were  quickly  sold.  Unfortunately,  the  sale  took  place
in  a declining  stock  market.  In  addition,  shortly  after  the  sales,  the  state-
owned  post,  telephone  and  telegraph  (PTT)  agency,  the  major  customer  of
Teletas  products,  announced  a  major  cutback  in  its  investment  program.  Within
a few  months,  the  Teletas  shares  had lost  half  of their  value.  As a result,
this  test  case  was  not  a success.  Planned  similar  divestitures  were  postponed
sine  die.
2851.  Another  test  case  was  the  sale  of the  Ansa  bottling  company  to  Coca
Cola  of the  United  States  in  October  1988.  Here  the  state  sold  all  its  shares
and  Coca  Cola  took  over  the  ownership  and  management  of the  firm.  Although  the
sales  method  differed  from  the  priorities  defined  at the  outset  by the  HPB,
the  sale  did  not stir  up controversy,  nor  has it  been  contested  since.  One
reason  is  that  Ansa  had  previously  been  a  private  company  that  had  been taken
over  by the  Government  upon  going  into  receivership.  As a test  case,  the  Ansa
sale  was  more  successful.  Ansa  operates  in  a relatively  competitive  sector.
52.  These  first  test  cases  of privatization,  which  also included  the  sale  of
four  animal  feed  plants,  were small  operations.  They  did  not  amount  to  much
tangible  progress  in  privatization,  despite  the  announced  ambitious
objectives.  Privatization  turned  out  to  be a slower  and  more  complicated
affair  than initially  anticipated.  This  was  especially  the  case  with respect
to large  holding  companies  like  Sfimerbank  (textiles  etc.)  and  Etibank
(banking,  mining  and  metal  products  etc.).  Privatizing  the  large  petro-
chemical  complex  (Petkim),  with  a de facto  domestic  monopoly  in several
products,  also  proved  more  complex  and  time-consuming  than  expected. The
privatization  of these  large  enterprises  has barely  begun.
D.  Stepped  Up Privatization
53.  The  contrast  between  the  Teletas  and  Ansa sales  showed  that if  the  state
wanted  to  move  ahead  fast  with  privatization,  the  sale  of blocks  of shares  to
foreigners  might  be the  most  effective  route.  The  HPB  consequently  adopted  a
new  decision  on sales  methods  opening  up the  possibility  of block  sales
29indiscriminately  to  nationals  and  foreigners.  The  new  decision  was  taken
without  explicitly  repealing,  or amending  the  earlier  decision  on target
groups  of  buyers.  This  was  an oversight  that  was  going  to  prove  costly.
54.  Resorting  to block  sales  meant  that  the  straight-forward  route  of stock
sales  on the  ISE  was  pushed  into  the  background.  Instead  complex  and  delicate
negotiations  had to  be undertaken  with  potential  buyers,  often  big
international  firms  with  much  in-house  negotiating  skills.  The  MHPPA  boosted
its  negotiating  skills  by  having  recourse  to  private  financial  consultants,
usually  investment  banks.  Only  a small  number  of  officials  were involved  in
the  negotiations.  These  turned  out  to  be time-consuming,  in  part  because  the
MHPPA  was  trying  to  negotiate  safeguards  for  the  employees  and  to  prevent
excessive  market  power.  The  agreements  were  not  made  public,  but the  press
reported  the  main  points.
55.  The  results  were  as follows.  In  1989  five  cement  plants  of the  state-
owned  Citosan  cement  company  were sold  to the  French  firm  Societe  des  Ciments
Francais  (SCF)  for $105 million.  In  addition,  SCF  agreed  to  undertake
investments  of $60 million  over  the  coming  three  years  in  order  to  modernize
the  plants.  The  same  year,  a  majority  of the  aircraft  catering  company  USAS
was sold  to an SAS  affiliate  for  S14  million  (70  percent  of the  USAS  shares
were sold).  The  privatization  of the  cement  plants  in particular  revealed  that
privatization  had  finally  acquired  momentum.  It  was  not to last.
56.  The  privatization  of large  SEEs  through  block  sales  to foreigners,  after
negotiations  that  were  not  particularly  transparent,  generated  growing
30opposition.  The  de facto  shift  in sales  method  away  from  an emphasis  on
nationals,  without  public  debate,  fuelled  the  opposition.  Privatization
started  to be equated  with "foreignization"  in  some  quarters.  The  MHPPA  had
however  not  attempted  to favor  foreigners  when inviting  bids for  the  firms  to
be  privatized.  It Just  so  happened  that  foreign  companies  bid  more  than  local
companies,  in  the  case  of the  group  of cement  plants,  about  twice  as  much
57.  The  opposition  part  "s  in  Parliament  filed  suit  against  MHPPA  for  the
Citosan  and  USAS  sales.  The  administrative  court  hearing  the  cases  issued  a 90
day  staying  order  in January  1990  for  both  sales.  The  argument  retained  by the
court  was  that  the  block  sales  to foreigners  had  contravened  the  first  HPB
decision  on sales  methods,  a decision  never  formally  repealed.  The
Government's  argument  that  the  subsequent  HPB  decision  on  blo;'.  sales  took
precedence  was  ruled  invalid.  The  staying  orders  were  appealed  by the
Government.  In the  meantime,  in early  March,  the  HPB  formally  cancelled  the
initial  decision  on sales  methods  and  explicitly  opened  the  door  to block
sales.  The  new  decision  was  made  retro-active  to the  first  decision.  The
administrative  court  refused  to  accept  this  procedure  and  by end-March  ruled
both  of the  sales  null  and  void.  In  June  the  Government  appealed  to the
Council  of State  (the  highest  administrative  court  in  the  country).  In  July
the  Council  of State  rejected  the  appeal  of the  Government,  thereby
irreversibly  cancelling  the  sales  of the  cement  plants  and  USAS.  The  block
sales  have  turned  into  an embarrassing  defeat  for  the  Government.  To add
Insult  to injury,  a  member  of the  center-right  True  Path  Party  has  filed  suit
against  the  HPB  decision  to cancel  the  initial  decision  on sales  methods  and
target  groups.
3158.  The  implications  are  potentially  far-reaching.  Privatization  through
block  sales  to foreigners  has  been  ruled  out  by the  courts.  Moreover,  the
whole  privatization  process  has  become  politically  contested.  The  Government
has  been  forced  to search  for  other  means  through  which  to pursue
privatization.  Its  opponents  are  gloating.  SCF  and  SAS  have  yet to  pull  out,
but  will soon  have  to in  accordance  with  the  court  decisions.  Their  experience
with  privatization  in  Turkey  has  not  been  a  happy  one.  This  cannot  but  tarnish
Turkey's  image  among  foreign  investors  and  make it  harder  to attract  foreign
direct  investment  toward  SEEs in  the  future,  even  it  the  legal  barrier  to
block  sales  were  to  be removed.
E.  Change  in  Strategy  in  Response  to Criticism
59.  The  events  of first  half  of 1990  obliged  the  Government  to  change  yet
again  its  privatization  strategy.  But  this  time  the  change  came in  response  to
political  and  popular  pressure.  The  Government's  declining  popular  support
(after  the  March  1989  local  elections)  and  the  growing  assertiveness  of the
opposition,  for  reasons  that  are  only  marginally  related  to privatization,
have  made  the  Government  more sensitive  to  criticism  of its  privatization
strategy.
60.  The  threat  of a ballooning  budget  deficit  in 1990,  mainly  due  to costly
wage settlements,  has  made the  Government  turn  once  more  to  privatization,
this  time  as  a source  of  additional  budget  revenues.  Since  the  stock  market
32has recently  been  booming  (see  Graph  4),  there  appears  to  be an opportunity  to
generate  revenue  through  SEE  share  sales  on the  ISE.
61.  Table  3  shows  the  sharp  increase  in the  value  of  average  daily  trading
on the  stock  exchange,  which  indicates  that  it  has  become  an important
component  of Turkey's  financial  system,  capable  of absorbing  a growing  number
of SEE  shares.  Caution  will  however  have  to  be exercised  so  as not  to overload
the  stock  exchange  with SEE  shares,  which  could  lead  to a slump  in  share
values.  The sharp  downturn  in  the  stock  market  in  August  1987  was  ostensibly
caused  by the  Government's  announcement  that  it intended  to  proceed  rapidly
with  a vast  privatization  program.  The  announcement  was  probably  more  a
catalyst  than  an  underlying  cause  for  the  downturn  (which  followed  a feverish
speculative  boom),  but it  does  underline  the  fact  that  the  stock  exchange  has
a limited  absorptive  capacity.  If  that  capacity  is exceeded,  stock  prices
tumble  and  the  stock  ey-..ange  gets  discredited.  Recovery  may not  be
instantaneous.
62.  In the  choice  between  sales  methods,  the  Government  is  turning  away  from
block  sales  to foreigners  and  toward  share  sales  on the  ISE.  The  Government
holds  large  amounts  of shares  in  companies  that  are  in  majority  privately
owned,  and  also  privately  managed.  Its  shares  in  these  companies  could  be sold
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34Table 3. Turkey  AZverage  Daily Trading Volume on the Istanbul Stock Exchange
1986-89 (in  millions of TL)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 1/
Treasury bills and government bonds  5.998  15,304  38,572  115,946  261215
Revenue sharing certificates  242  1,618  1,701  8,717  11183
Private sector bonds  340  2,256  4,849  10,593  14962
Stocks  35  425  589  6,809  44176
Total avg. daily tradinA volume  6 615  19 603  45,711  142.065  331 536
T.tal avg. daily tradina
volume at 1986 prices 2/  6.615  8 446  14 187  29.789  50.694
Memorandum items
(percent of total)
Treasury bills and government bonds  90.7  78.1  84.4  81.6  78.8
Revenue sharing certificates  3.7  8.3  3.7  6.1  3.4
Private sector bonds  5.1  11.5  10.6  7.5  4.5
Stocks  0.5  2.2  1.3  4.8  13.3
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1/ Most recent data available  January-April
2/ Deflated by WPI (1986-100)
Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange
without  undue  difficulty,  provided  the  sales  are  spread  through  time  to
prevent  the  stock  exchange  from  becoming  saturated  with  SEE  shares.  This  would
be a revenue-raising  effort  and  would  presumably  have  little,  if  any,  impact
on enterprise  performance.
63.  During  the  first  quarter  of 1990,  the  MHPPA  sold  public  shares  on the
TSE  for  about  TL 400  billion  (US  $160  million). The  MHPPA  has little  in-
house  stock  market  expertise,  and  some  brokers  contend  that  in  some  cases  the
sales  were  at  prices  30-40  percent  below  what could  have  been  obtained  had
they  been  handled  more  professionally.  The  MHPPA  has  become  the  major
participant  on the  ISE.  It  has  evolved  into  a  market  maker.  There  have  been
charges  of r%rket-rigging.  The  MHPPA  has  intervened  to  prevent  the  price  of
35some  recently  sold  SEE  shares  from  falling. This  has  meant  that it  has  had  to
buy  back  a  portion  of the  SEE shares  sold  to  protect  their  value. This
sales/purchase  pattern  has  been  dubbed  privatization  cum  nationalization  by
the  press.
64.  Because  the  ISE  suffers  from  various  technical  and  administrative
bottle-necks,  the  MHPPA  has since  April  1990  resorted  to a scheme  of nation-
wide share  sales  through  the  extensive  network  of Is  Bank (a  leading
commercial  bank  with  mixed  private/public  ownership).  The intention  is  back  to
the  original  one  of spreading  share  ownership  to the  people.  Under  the  Is  Bank
scheme,  the  state  minority  shares  in  six  profitable  companies  (Erdemir  steel
mi'l,  Celik  Halat  steel  cables,  Arcelik  appliances,  Cukurova  Elektrik,  Kepez
Elektrik  and  Bolu  cement)  were sold  over  a three-week  period  starting  April  9.
Shares  were  available  at the  470  odd  computerized  branches  of Is Bank  and  four
offices  in  Europe.  The  price  was  based  on the  ISE  price  the  previous  week.
There  was  an initial  ceiling  of TL 10  million  on sales  to  any individual
(subsequently  lowered),  but this  was  not  much  of a constraint  since  family  and
friends  could  be  used to  circumvent  the  ceiling.
65.  The  share  sales  through  Is Bank  were  a success.  In  the  first  round,  the
Erdemir  shares  were  sold  out  within  a few  hours.  There  were  however  some
allegations  that  the  shares  had informally  been  distributed  before  the  sales
to family  and  friends  of Is Bank  branch  officers.  The  allocation  of shares
among  the  470  odd  branch  offices  was  according  to  estimated  demand,  with some
possibilities  to  transfer  shares  among  offices  according  to demand.  The  shares
were sold  at pre-announced  fixed  prices  (reflecting  the  ISE  price  at the  end
36of the  previous  -eek).  Given  the interest  in  the shares,  sales  had to be
rationed,  but as  mentioned  above,  the individual  ceilings  are  unlikely  to have
proven  effective.
66.  Only  a small  portion  of the total  shares  of any company  was sold  under
the scheme,  ranging  from  3 percent  for  Erdemir  to  13  percent  for Celik  Halat.
The state  retained  some  minority  shares  in  all cases.  Nonetheless,  sales
proceeds  totalled  TL 343  billion (around  US $135  million).  The number  of
buyers  exceeded  91 thousand.  The sales  scheme  was thus  also a success  in
spreading  share  ownership,  but in  no case  did it  lead  to a change in  ownership
control.
67.  During  and after  the  three-week  sales  period,  MHPPA  continued  its
practice  of intervening  on the stock  exchange  to  make sure  that  the shares
sold  did  not lose  value (the  memory  of the  Teletas  sales  was to be exorcised).
This  kind  of price  support  proved  successful  in  preventing  a fall in share
prices.  Most of the shares  sold  have  actually  gained  slightly  in  value since
April/Hay  even though  the  stock  exchange  index  has  plateaued.  After the  sales,
Is Bank  has remained  in  the share  business  by standing  ready  to  buy shares
back  from  the  purchasers  and to assist  these  with transactions  on the ISE.
Little  wonder  brokers  feel threatened  by the Is  Bank  sales  scheme.
68.  The sales  of shares  through  Is Bank,  and continuing  sales  on the ISE,
are expected  by MHPPA  to yield  revenue  of TL  1.5 trillion  by mid-year  (US  $600
million).  Of this  amount,  70  percent  will  reportedly  be transferred  to the
Treasury, while  MHPPA  will  keep the  remaining  30  percent  to cover  its  own
expenses  and  to finance  some  of its  investment  projects,  as well  as to support
SEEs in  its "care"  while awaiting  privatization.  Operators  on the ISE
3'generally  believe  that  the  market  can  absorb  share  sales  of the  magnitude
projected  by NHPPA.  Expectations  that  the  Treasury  would  be able to  receive  TL
3-4 trillion  from share  sales  are  however  likely  to  prove exaggerated,  because
sales  on such  a large  scale  may drive  down  share  prices  by saturating  the
market.
69.  Table  4 compares  the  proceeds  of the  share  sales  accruing  to the
Treasury  with the Central  Government  budget  for 1990.  At TL 1.1  trillion
(after  deduction  of the 30  percent  retained  by the  MHPPA),  the  proceeds  would
correspond  to 10.5  percent  of the  targeted  budget  deficit.  Privatization  in
the form  of share  sales  would  thus  make a  not negligible  contribution  to the
bridging  of the budget  deficit.  The  budget  foresees  however  revenue  from
another  type  of privatization.  In  addition  to selling  SEE shares,  Treasury
lands  are  projected  to  be sold  for  a total  amournt  of TL 1.5 trillion  (US  $600
million).  State  lands  are  thus to  be privatized.  The land  sales  have gotten
off to  a slow  and  unpromising  start,  but  assuming  they  materialize  as planned,
revenue  from this  source  would defray  another  14.3  percent  of the  budget
deficit.  Using the  conceptually  more  appropriate  approach  of considering  land
sales  a financing  item,  rather  than  a revenue  item,  total  proceeds  from
privatization  woulA cover  21.7  percent  of the  budget  deficit.  Privatization
would thereby  become  a major  source  for the  financing  of the  budget  deficit.
F.  Planned  Future  Privatizations
70.  The  MHPPA  plans  to  pursue  its  various  methods  of  privatization,  despite
the  recent  setbacks  in  court,  which  should  be contrasted  with the success  of
the share  sales.  An eclectic  approach  will  be followed.  The  Government  hopes
to  make 1990,  and 1991,  years  of a breakthrough  in  privatization.  The list  of
companies  to be  privatized  comprises  nearly  70  firms (see  Annex  II),
38admittedly  of  varying  size,  but  includes  several  heavyweights.  Whether  these
ambitious  targets  can  be realized,  despite  the  growing  opposition  to
privatization  and the  limited  popular  support  and  cohesion  of the  Government,
remains  to  be seen.
Table  4.  Central  Government  1990  Budget
(in trillions of Turkish Lira)
Item  Amount
Revenue  53.9
Tax revenue  43.7
Other revenue  10.2
of which:  land sales  1.5
Expendituxe  64.4
Personnel  20.0
Interest payments  14.6




Share sales of TL 1.1 trillion (70 per-  10.5
cent of total) in percent of deficit
Land sales of TL 1.5 trillion  14.3
in percent of deficit
Share and land sales of TL 2.6  21.7
trillion in percent of deficit
(considering land sales a financing
item instead of revenue)
Source  :  Treasury
71.  The state-owned  petrochemical  conglomerate  Petkim  has been  on the
privatization  list  for  over  a  year,  during  which  international  consultants
have  helped  with the  preparation  for  privatization.  Tangible  progress  has
however  been  slow  in  coming.  The  company  is a  major  SEE  employing  close  to
8,000  people  and  recording  gross  sales  of  TL 1.6  trillion  ($1.1  billion)  in
1988.  Petkim  has  been  revamped  into  a holding  company  under  MHPPA,  but this
has  not ended  its  previous  position  in the  government  machinery  in terms  of
39reporting  requirements  and  close  control  by ministerial  supervisory
authorities.
72.  MHPPA  is exploring  various  options,  such  as partial,  or  unit  by unit,
sales  of PETKIM  to  foreign  firms.  For  the  near future,  emphasis  will  however
be put  on share  sales  through  the  Is  Bank  scheme.  Sales  started  by end-June
1990.  Since  the  shares  of Petkim  are  not  traded  on the  ISE,  the  sales  price  of
the  shares  (TL  2,500  per  share,  around  $1)  had to  be determined
administratively.  The  company  is  profitable,  in  part  because  Petkim  has a de
facto  monopoly  on the  domestic  market  for  many  of its  products.  Profits  rose
by 75  percent  in 1989  to TL 623  billion  ($290  million)  compared  to an
inflation  rate  of 70  percent.  Its  nominal  share  capital  was increased  five-
fold  just  before  the  share  sale  to  TL 2  trillion  (US  $800  million)  of which  a
maximum  of 15  percent  is  to  be sold.  Since  the  shares  will be sold  at a
premium,  sales  proceeds  of TL 0.6-1.0  trillion  are  expected.  This  would  dwarf
previous  SEE  share  sales.  Once  again,  individual  purchases  are subject  to  a
ceiling  (in  this  case  TL 30  million,  around  $12,000).  By limiting  the  amount
of shares  an individual  can  buy,  the  Government  intends  to  make sure  that  no
single  person,  or  group  of  persons,  especially  foreigners,  will  gain  a
controlling  interest  in  Petkim,  which  is  widely  seen  to  be of strategic
importance  to the  economy.  Petkim  employees  will  be able  to  buy  TL 50-60
billion  of shares  under  a fifteen  month  installment  scheme  with  no interest
charged.
73.  After  the  sale,  Petkim  shares  will  be quoted  on the  ISE.  The
appropriateness  of the  administratively  determined  sales  price  will  then
40quickly  be tested.  Is Bank  will continue  to provide  brokerage  services  to
purchasers  of Petkim  shares.  Much  to the  chagrin  of independent  brokerage
firms,  Is Bank  seems  set  on emerging  as the  major  brokerage  firm  in  Turkey,  in
addition  to  being  the  country's  second  largest  bank.
74.  The  management  of Petkim  has  however  ideas  of izs  own  regarding
privatization.  According  to  management,  it  would  be preferable  to privatize
Petkim  without  resorting  to  sales  of shares  or production  units.  Since
domestic  demand  is  projected  to double  by 1997-98,  and  Petkim  wants  to
maintain  its  market  share,  it  wants  to  double  its  production  capacity.  This
would  be done  by seeking  joint  ventures  with  foreign  firms,  which  would
provide  all  the  financing  needed  for  the  doubling  of capacity,  while  relying
on existing  Petkim  infrastructure  to reduce  cost.  In  return,  the  foreign  firms
would  become  part  owners  of total  capacity.  The  sensitive  issue  of sales  to
foreigners  would  be avoided,  while  production  capacity  would  be doubled,
without  requiring  any  financing  from  the  state.  Profits,  and  risks,  would  be
shared  with foreign  partners.  In  June 1990  the  Government  decided  to endorse
the  "privatization"  scheme  proposed  by management,  but  how  this  scheme  will
complement  the  share  sales  through  Is  Bank  remains  to  be seen.
75.  Another  big state  conglomerate  slated  for  privatization  is Sumerbank
(textiles,  retail  outlets,  a bank  etc.).  It  has  also  been  converted  into  a
holding  under  MHPPA,  but  this  seems  mainly  to  have  left  it in  an ambiguous
legal  position.  Numerous  consultants'  reports  have  been  written  about  its
privatization,  but  no major  decisions  have  yet  been  taken.  Progress  has
consequently  been  limited,  despite  much  talk.
4176.  Because  of its  size  and  heterogeneity,  Sumerbank  can  only  be privatized
in  stages  with  different  buyers.  One  possibility  could  be to lease  or
franchise  retail  outlets  to private  operators.  In  mid-June  1990,  Sumerbank
management  announced  that  it  was  going  to  proceed  with a "licensed  seller
system"  in  order  to eliminate  the  liquidity  shortage  of the  company. Sellers
would  be certified,  and  assured  of supplies,  based  on a turnover  they  would
commit  themselves  to (with  presumably  penalties  for  non-compliance).
Management  was  at  pains  to emphasize  that  the  system  of licensed  sellers  did
not  amount  to privatization.  It is  noteworthy  that  the  new system  is  a
management  initiative  that  has  been  approved  neither  by the  HPB  nor the  MHPPA.
77.  Many  of the  production  units  of Sumerbank  will  need some  rehabilitation
before  they  can  be sold,  but  where  the  funds  for  this  would  come  from  remains
uncertain.  Sumerbank  has  no funds  to spare,  because  it is  heavily  indebted,
with interest  payments  consuming  a  high  and  rising  portion  of operating
revenue.  Because  it is  a company  with  a high  profile  throughout  the  country,
political  interference  is  a  regular  feature.  This  hampers  both  efficient
operations  and  progress  in  privatization.
78.  The  state's  chain  of  hotels  and  related  tourism  facilities  are  grouped
in the  Turban  company  that  is  also  scheduled  for  privatization  in  the  near
term.  Here  the  task  may  be more  straight-forward,  since  tourism  is  growing
rapidly  in  Turkey  and  both  national  and  foreign  private  investors  are  showing
great  interest  in  this  sector.  Yet  the  prospective  sale  of conspicuous  public
facilities,  like  marinas,  is  not  without  opponents.
4279.  The  privatization  of the  electricity  distribution  network  is  planned  for
the  next  four  to five  years.  The  first  case  involved  the  transfer  of the
electricity  distribution  and  sales  rights  to a  private  company  for  an area
east  of Istanbul.  The  transfer  was  resisted  by the  employees  until  the  Turkish
Electricity  Board  and  the  private  partner  signed  an amendment  to the
privatization  agreement  ruling  out  major  layoffs.
G.  Lessons
80.  There  are  numerous  lessons  from  Turkey's  mixed  experience  with
privatization.12/  The  initial  objectives  were  generally  laudable,  but  when
added  together  were  probably  too  ambitious.  There  were  also  many  objectives
with  no clear  priorities.  Nor  were trade-offs  spelled  out.  High-sounding
objectives  were  not complemented  by concrete  action  programs.  There  were  many
ideas  floating  around  but  few  specific  actions  at  hand.  A big  gap  remained
between  rhetoric  and  reality.13/
81.  The institutional  arrangements  were improvised.  Privatization  was  added
to the  already  mixed  bag  of  activities  of the  MHPPA,  thereby  stretching  its
12i  One  observer  of the  Turkish  privatization  experience  would  go so  far  as
to sum  it  up in  one  word:  frustration,  Leeds,  op.cit.
21/ The  experience  of  Turkey  resembles  that  of several  other  developing
countries  adopting  broad  privatization  programs  in  the  sense  that:  "there
remains  a  marked  divergence  betweeu  stated  intentions  and  follow  up actions"
in  part  because  of "the  inevitable  gap  between  ideological  rhetoric  and  a real
intention  to  act",  Hemming,  Richard  and  Mansoor,  Ali:  "Privatization  and
Public  Enterprises",  International  Monetary  Fund,  Occasional  Paper  56,  1988.
43thin  staff  even  further.  It  had limited  in-house  experience  and  skills  in  the
matter  and  had  therefore  to rely  extensively  on external  consultants,  who did
not  always  provide  consistent  advice.  The  ability  of  MHPPA  to  critically
assess  the  advice  was  perhaps  also  limited.  Moreover,  MHPPA  was  a specialized
Extra  Budgetary  Fund  with  few  established  procedures  of public  accountability.
Nor  did  it  have an independent  power  base  or regular  access  to,  and  support,
from  the  highest  political  authority.  The  HPB  was  such  an august  body  that  it
had  a multitude  of other  tasks  on its  agenda,  thus  limiting  the  time  it  could
devote  to the  design  of a privatization  program  and  the  monitoring  of its
implementation.  In sum,  MHPPA  was  not  well  equipped  to  deal  with a  matter  as
intricate  and  delicate  as privatization,  a fortiori  in light  of the  vast scale
of the  privatization  program  envisaged.
82.  The  advance  trumpeting  of the  great  results  that  were to  be achieved
through  privatization  generated  opposition  among  groups  that  potentially  might
be adversely  affected,  for  instance  employees  and  retirees.  Premature  public
declarations  ahead  of specific  proposals  that  could  have comprised  safeguards
for  groups  at risk,  made  privatization  appear  threatening.  Because
expectations  were  raised  above  the  ability  to deliver,  attempts  were  made  to
close  the  gap  hastily  through  improvisations.  This  did  not  add  to the
credibility  of the  privatization  program.
83.  The legal  base for  privatization  was  not  ascertained  with  the  required
thoroughness.  Decree-Law  233  and  Law  3291  were  rather  general  in  nature  and
contained  several  ambiguities  open  to conflicting  interpretations.
Safeguarding  the  legal  flank  should  have  been  more the  responsibility  of the
44Government  than  potential  buyers,  which  might  see  no need  to question  the
right  of a sovereign  government  to  sell  what it  is  offering  for  sale.  The
ambiguities  that  persisted  in the  legal  texts,  written  to create  the  framework
for  privatization,  provided  the  opponents  of  privatization  with  a splendid  ram
with  which  to  break  through  the  Government's  positions.  Once  privatization,  or
a  major  version  thereof,  had  become  a court  matter,  it  would  at least  be
delayed,  at most  blocked.  It is  an  acute  embarrassment  for  the  Government  to
have the  courts  cancel  two  major  agreements  with  foreign  partners.  The  whole
privatization  program  has  thereby  become  surrounded  by uncertainty.  The
conflict  over  two  major  privatization  agreements  with  foreign  firms  has fanned
latent  nationalistic  feelings  and  raised  doubts  as to  what  role,  if  any,
foreign  firms  and  consultants  should  play in  the  privatization  process.
84.  In  negotiating  block  sales  with  both  foreigners  and  nationals,  MHPPA  was
up against  formidable  parties  on the  other  side  of the  table.  Foreign  and
national  firms  knew  their  business,  what  they  wanted  and  how  to go for  it.
MHPPA  enlisted  the  assistance  of  consultants  to rectify  the  balance,  but  this
may  not  have  been  enough.  The  secrecy  that,  perhaps  understandably,  surrounded
the  negotiations  meant  that  charges  of  poor  bargaining  could  not be easily
refuted.  Parliament  was  kent  in  the  dark,  which  could  not  but  wet the  appetite
of the  opposition  to attack  the  privatization  program.
85.  Admittedly,  much  was  at stake  and  the  issues  involved  were  difficult.
Despite  the  MHPPA  practice  of requesting  external  audits  of companies  to  be
privatized,  asset  valuation  and  the  determination  of  an initial  asking  price
were  no easy  tasks.  The  assumption,  or transfer,  of  old liabilities  was
45another  not so  easy  task.  So too  was  the  handling  of  acquired  labor  and
pension  rights.  Prevention  of excessive  market  power  was  also  to  be sought.
Even  before  starting  to  negotiate,  MHPPA  had  to determine  whether  a company
should  first  be rehabilitated  in  order  to  enhance  its  salability.  If
rehabilitation  were decided,  how  would  it  be done  and  where  would  the  money
come  from?
86.  The  disjointed  and  sometimes  hasty  way  in  which  privatization  was
designed  and  implemented,  effectively  meant  that  there  was  no consistent
overall  strategy  within  which  instruments  and  specific  cases  could  be fitted
and  evaluated.  Granted  that  privatization  was  a new  endeavor  of the
Government,  there  would  have  to  be some  pilot  schemes.  Inevitably  some
mistakes  would  be  made.  The  problem  was  that  the  trial  and  error  approach  went
on and  on.  A pattern  of advances  followed  by retreat  emerged.  There  was
continuing  hesitation  and  confusion.  Nor  did  conflicting  public  statements  by
government  officials  and  unilateral  declarations  by SEE  management  help.
87.  Another  mistake  that  was  to prove  serious  with  the  passage  of time  was
that  few  attempts  were  made to  depoliticize  the  privatization  issue  by seeking
support  from  other  political  parties  and  major  interest  groups.  As a result,
privatization  became  a vulnerable  issue  for  the  Government,  open  to attack.  It
is  hardly  surprising  that  opponents  of the  Government  should  seize  on this
opportunity,  in  part  for  less  than  noble  reasons.  By  becoming  controversial,
privatization  turned  into  an obvious  target  for  an  opposition  bent  on
attacking  the  Government  on each  and  every  occasion.  The  assertiveness  of the
opposition  was  fanned  by its  perception  that  the  Government  was  weakening  in
46general  and  in  retreat  on the  privatization  issue  in  particular.  The  attacks
of the  opposition  should  however  be seen  in  a broader  perspective:  they  are
often  made  for  tactical  reasons  and  focus  on particular  methods  employed  more
than  on the  overall  objectives  of the  program.  Privatization  has  not  become
taboo,  but  both  the  solection  and  ranking  of objectives  and  the  instruments
for  their  attainment  have  come  under  increasing  debate.
B.  Opposition
88.  Diverse  groups  have  joined  ranks  in  opposition  to the  Government's
privatization  program.  Neglecting  and  underestimating  potential  opposition  to
privatization  has  turned  out  to  be a less  than  wise  approach.  Few  efforts  were
made to  build  a consensus  around  privatization.  The  intrinsic  merits  of
privatization  are  not so incontestable,  or self-evident,  that  the  issue  can
simply  be considered  above  debate.  The  Government  may  once  have  thought  so,
but  growing  opposition  is  forcing  it  to change  its  mind.
89.  Opposition  to  privatization  has  come  even  from  within  the  Government.
Senior  politicians  leading  various  parliamentary  factions,  local  politicians
from  sites  hosting  SEEs  and  government  officials  are  holding,  and  proclaiming
divergent  views  about  privatization.  Unfortunately  there  are  today  few
economic  issues  on  which  the  Governmenr  is  fully  united.  Factionalism  has
broken  out  into  the  open.  Moreover,  MHPPA  itself  is  not  spared  from  internal
dissent,  publicly  displayed.  The  official  in  charge  of its  Privatization
Department  resigned  in  March  1990,  reportedly  following  a disagreement  with
the  General  Manager  over  which  sales  strategy  to follow.  The  person  in charge
47of the  Public  Participation  Department  has  temporarily  been  put  in charge  of
the  Privatization  Department  as well.  By  June  1990  this  interim  arrangement
was still  in effect.  The  leader  of one  of the  opposition  parties  has
threatened  MHPPA  officials  with  personal  liability  suits  for  alleged
mismanagement  of privatization  cases.  MHPPA  may therefore  move  more  cautiously
in  the  future.
90.  In  April  1990  the  Government  decided  to revamp  the  MHPPA.  It  was  split
into  two  different  administrations:  the  Public  Partnership  Administration
(PPA)  and  the  Mass  Hous.ing  Fund  (MHF).  PPA  was  also  entrusted  with  the
implementation  of the  privatization  program.  Simultaneously  the  HPB  delegated
some  of its  authority  to PPA,  for  instance  in terms  of the  handling  of revenue
sharing  bonds.  The  intention  was  to  make  PPA  more  autonomous  and  thus  more
efficient,  while  insulating  it  from  political  pressures.
91.  It is  not  surprising  that  SEEs  should  constitute  nuclei  of opposition  to
privatization.  After  all,  the  management  and  workers  within  SEEs  have
something  to lose.  The  management  of some  SEEs  has  openly  displayed  views  that
differ  from  those  of the  MHPPA.  Going  beyond  mere  dissent,  it is  preparing  and
advocating  rival  privatization  schemes.  Potential  buyers  can  only  wonder  which
scheme  will  ultimately  be adopted  by the  Government,  or  whether  consistent
schemes  will  be adopted.  It is  however  clear  that  by displaying  publicly  such
a disunited  front,  the  Government  is  weakening  its  bargaining  position.  The
work  force  of SEEs  is  naturally  suspicious  about  what  will  happen  to  acquired
labor  rights  (employment,  wages,  pensions  etc.)  under  a new,  and  maybe  even
foreign  owner  and  manager.  Through  its  unions,  labor  is  expressing  increasing
48disquiet  about  privatization  and is insisting  on  measures  to safeguard  its
interests.  Such  measures  could  however  detract  from  the  salability  of a
company.
92.  Other  interest  groups  have  also  joined  the  chorus  of opposition  to
privatization.  Since  several  SEEs  are  in  distant  communities  with  few
alternative  employment  opportunities,  it is  hardly  surprising  that  the
localities  concerned  should  have  voiced  reservations  about  privatizatlon.  Nor
is it surprising  that  local  industrialists  should  have  welcomed,  with  less
than  enthusiasm,  the  prospect  of  more  competition,  and  the  discontinuation  of
cozy  arrangements  with  SEEs.  This  seems,  for  instance,  to  have  been  the  case
in the  cement  industry,  where  local  producers  fear  the  loss  of rents  through
the  removal  of a de facto  price  floor  set  high  enough  to enable  inefficiernt
public  plants  to  survive.  Academics,  some  of whom  are  still  wedded  to statist
and  nationalist  policies,  have  rlso  decried  the  sale  of the  national  patrimony
to foreigners  at bar<ain  prices.
93.  The  most  serious  challenge  to the  Government's  privatization  program  has
however  come  from  the  opposition  parties  in  Parliament.  They  are  spearheading
the  attack  on the  program  through  the  inittation  of the  widely  publicized
legal  action.  The  cour_;  cases  against  the  Citosan  and  USAS sales  were  brought
by these  opposition  parties.  They  have  perceived  privatization  as  a promising
vehicle  through  which  to  attack  and  discredit  the  Government,  especially  since
it  has staked  so  much  prestige  on the  issue  and  delivered  so little.
4994.  The  opposition  parties  have  clearly  devoted  some  time  and  effort  to
devise  a systematic  criticism  of the  Government's  privatization  program.  In
their  stated  view,  if  properly  designed  and implemented,  privatization  can
still  prove  worthwhile  for  Turkey.  But  the  legal  framework  has first  to  be
established.  Privatization  is  unlikely  to  be successful  unless  both  political
and  economic  stability  prevail.  The  opposition  claims  that  in today's  climate
neither  prevails.  The survival  of the  present  Government  beyond  the  next
parliamentary  elections  (to  be held  no later  than  in  November  1992)  is  doubted
in  many  quarters.  Persistent  high inflation,  in  combination  with continuing
large  public  sector  deficits,  create  an  uncertain  macroeconomic  environment
conducive  to a shortening  of  planning  horizons  and  a reluctance  to invest.
95.  What  the  opposition  parties  may  find  particularly  galling  is that  the
Government  has  explicitly  turned  to sales  of SEE  shares  as  a means  to finance
the  budget  deficit.  The  deficit  has  tended  to grow  becausa  of large  wage
settlements  intended,  inter  alia,  to restore  the  Government's  sagging  popular
support.  For  the  opposition  parties  the  Government  has found  an easy  way out
of its  fiscal  predicament,  and  what  is  even  worse,  through  a means  that  is
unlikely  to remain  available  to  the  same  extent  were  the  opposition  parties  to
come  to  power  in  a few  years'  time.
96.  The  opposition  parties  argue  that  SEEs  that  are  strategically  important
on economic  and  military  grounds  should  be excluded  f-.om  privatization  and
definitely  not  ceded  to foreigners.  The  same  holds  for  SEEs  with  monopoly
power.  The  view  has  also  been  presented  that  SEEs  that  are  productive  and
profitable  should  not  be privatized  (were  this  position  to be adoapted,
50privatization  would  become  more  difficult).  The  opposition  sees  no a priori
reason  to discriminate  against  foreign  capital,  provided  it  generates  local
value  added  and  employment,  in  addition  to  bringing  in  new  resources  and
technology,  while  enihancing  access  to  foreign  markets.  Moreover,  public
monopolies  should  not  be converted  into  private  monopolies;  on the  contrary,
privatization  should  systematically  be used  as a  means  to  promote  competition.
The  Government  is  not the  only  party  with  a  penchant  for  wish lists.
97.  In the  specific  cases  of the  Citosan  and  Usas  sales,  the  opposition
parties  use  a well-established  argument  among  opponents  of privatization
programs:  that  the  sales  prices  were  disgracefully  low  and  that  MHPPA
mismanaged  the  negotiations.  Such  charges  are  perhaps  inevitable,  given  the
closed  doors  behind  which  the  negotiations  were  conducted.  But is  has  proven
difficult  for  the  Government  to  refute  the  charges.  Another  charge  levelled
against  the  sales  is that  they  have  enabled  the  foreign  buyers  to constitute
de facto  monopolies,  be it  locally  (the  cement  plants),  or at all  major
airports  (the  USAS  catering  service). Private  cement  plants  do exist,  but  not
evenly  throughout  the  country. According  to this  view,  one  monopoly  has  been
traded  for  another,  with  the  difference  that  today  the  monopoly  profits  accrue
to foreigners.
I.  Nedium-term  Outlook
98.  The  Government's  privatization  strategy  continues  to evolve  and  to
adapt,  both  to  accumulating  experience  and  outside  pressure Critics  of the
program  would  view it  differently  and  contend  that it  remains  where  it  has
51always  bee,i:  in  a state  of flux.  In  any  case,  the  strategy  is today  not  very
clear,  improvisations  and  ad hocery  persist.  The institutional  arrangements
are  weak,  while  the legal  framework  is  ambiguous.  Choices  between  sales
methods  have  been  varied  and  reversed,  and  implementation  in  general  is
subject  to  an excessive  degree  of  uncertainty.  The  recent  sales  of SEE  shares
on the  stock  exchange  and  through  the  extensive  network  of Is  Bank  offices
have  however  been  a success,  both  in  terms  of generating  revenue  and
disseminating  share  ownership.  Caution  will  however  have  to  be exercised  so  as
not  to  overtax  the  absorptive  capacity  of the  stock  market.
99.  Heightened  economic  and  political  uncertainty  do  not  produce  an
environment  particularly  favorable  to privatization.  The investment  climate  is
depressed  for  physical  investment,  in  good  part  because  private  investors  have
little  faith  in the  economic  policies  of  the  Government.  Foreign  investors  are
likely  to  be on their  guard  after  the  recent  court  decisions  annulling
privatization  agreements  through  block  sales  to foreigners.  Privatization  of
parts  of electricity  distribution  could  be an exception,  since  electricity
demand  is  widely  believed  to  be on a lasting  upward  trend,  with  pricing  less
rigid  than  in the  past.  Because  of the  sharp  rise  in  share  values  on the  ISE,
the  outlook  for  portfolio  investment  is  brighter.  In the  short  run,  the
Government  may therefore  be right  in  emphasizing  share  sales.  A downturn  in
share  prices  could  however  quickly  shut  off  this  option.
100. Contrary  to the  announced  ranking  of the  objectives  of privatization
(see  para  45  above),  with the  passage  of time  one  objective  has  de facto
assumed  overriding  importance:  that  is  the  generation  of proceeds  with  which
52to  help  finance  the  budget  deficit.  The  difficulties  encountered  in coming  to
grips  with continuing  large  deficits,  aggravated  by  high  wage increases  since
1989,  have forced  the  Government  to look  for  additional  immediate  revenue.
With  the  scope  for  expenditure  compression  limited  and  tax  reform  not
considered  feasible  for  political  reasons,  privatization  has  moved  to the
foreground  as a source  of  revenue,  be it  through  sales  of SEEs  shares  or sales
of treasury  lands.  The  success  of the  initial  SEE  share  sales  has  prompted  the
Government  to  envisage  larger  sales  in  order  to  finance  a sizable  portion  of
the  1990  budget  deficit  through  this  means.
101. Since  the  minority  shares  sold  were  in  generally  profitable  companies,
the  sales  did  not  alleviate  the  budget  of  any  burden  to finance  loss-makers.
Rather  the  contrary,  the  Government  was  trading  future  revenue  (dividends)  for
present  revenue  (share  sales  proceeds).  The  discounting  of future  revenue  is
bound  to  have  reflected  the  uncertainty  of the  future  performance  of the
company  in  a rapidly  evolving  economy  plagued  by  high inflation.  The
continuation  of present  management  arrangements  means  that  the  scope  for
future  efficiency  gains,  leading  inter  alia  to  higher  tax  payments,  is
circumscribed.  The  upshot  of all  this  is that  through  the  share  sales
mechanism,  the  Government  has etsentially  discounted  future  revenue,  at a
discount  rate  that  is  hard  to determine,  but  that  may  have  been  relatively
high,  given  the  uncertainties  perceived  by the  buyers.
102. A privatization  program  limited  to  a budget  deficit  financing  technique
is  however  a long  way  from  the  initial  set  of  high-sounding  objectives,
foremost  among  which  were  the  reduced  role  of ths  state  in the  economy  and
53greater  efficiency  and  international  competitiveness.  The  generation  of
revenue  for  the  budget  has  moved  from  last  to first  objective.  Reducing  the
role  of the  state  in the  economy  through  privatization  has  barely  begun.  The
relative  weight  of SEEs  has diminished  in terms  of investment,  but  not in
terms  of employment.  It is  too  early  to tell  whether  the  few  cases  of
consummated  privatization  cases  will  lead  to greater  efficiency.  The  sale  of
minority  shares  is  however  by itself  unlikely  to  have  much impact  on
efficiency.  It is essentially  a portfolio  operation  that  leaves  the  existing
private  management  in  place.  Consequently,  efficiency  is  unlikely  to  have  been
enhanced  through  the  privatization  operations  concluded  so far.
103. The  stock  market  is  for  the  moment  on an  upward  trend,  mainly  because  it
is  a small  but  growing  investment  outlet  that  is  perceived  to  be attractive  in
relative  risk/yield  terms.  As long  as this  situation  prevails,  sales  of SEE
shares  on the  stock  market  will  fetch  good  prices.  But  if the  Government
continues  to  off-load  SEE  shares  on the  stock  market,  because  it  needs  to
generate  additional  revenue,  a sellers  market  could  turn  into  a buyers  market.
Then  if the  Government  wished  to  continue  to raise  cash  in  this  way, it  would
be forced  to sell  the  shares  at  a discount.  In  the  same  vein,  if the
Government  is  seen  to  be pressed  for  revenue,  block  sales  of SEEs  to private
partners,  be they  domestic  or  foreign,  may  only  take  place  at a  heavy
discounting  of the  future  earnings  stream  of the  enterprise  privatized.  In the
end,  a government  that  is  privatizing  out  of fiscal  necessity  may  not  be able
to  get  a satisfactory  price  for  the  assets  sold.
54104.  Political  uncertainty  also  detracts  from  the  prospects  of privatization.
The  present  cabinet  is  not  seen  as very  forceful  or  united.  A cabinet
reshuffle  may  suffice  to  reduce  political  uncertainty.  Or early  elections  may
be required,  in  which  case  privatization  is likely  to  be put  on the  back-
burner  until  after  the  elections.
105.  In  sum,  the  overall  outlook  for  privatization  has  to be considered
rather  dim,  despite  the  prospects  for  increased  share  sales  in the  months  to
come.  Recent  reversals  and  continuing  uncertainty  have  slowed  the
privatization  process  and  could  conceivably  even  stall  it.  The  Government
missed  a chance  by  not devising  a consistent  strategy  accompanied  by specific
action  programs,  based  on a realistic  assessment  of opportunities  and
constraints  of the  specific  Turkish  setting.  It improvised  and  wavered.  In the
absence  of a coherent  strategy,  and  following  a path  of least  resistance
(reinforced  by fiscal  pressures),  the  Government  ultimately  reduced
privatization  to a  minority  share  divestiture  program.  The  Government  had  not
secured  the  legal  basis  for  full-fledged  privatization.  Nor  did  it  attempt  to
depoliticize  the  issue  by seeking  broad  support.  Privatization  became
controversial  and  provided  the  opposition  with  an opportunity  for  attacking
the  Government.
106.  As long  as privatization  iemains  an intensely  contested  political
football,  with  no attempts  to find  a common  middle  ground  between  the
Government  and  the  vocal  opposition  parties,  progress  will  remain  slow,
especially  in  today's  charged  political  climate.  The  process  may  even  be
reversible.  This  does  however  not  mean  that  in  a climate  of less  economic  and
55political  uncertainty,  privatization  could  not  be made  to  play  a significant
role.  The  performance  of many  SEEs  remains  poor  and  will  have  to be improved
one  day,  be it  through  privatization,  or other  means.  Until  such  a day,  the
structural  transformation  of the  Turkish  economy  pursued  since  1980  will
remain  incomplete.
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59ANNEK I
List of State Economic Enterprises
and Public Economic Establishment
State Economic Enterprises
Enterprise  Subsidiary
1  Thrkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat  1  Gikven  Sigorta T.A.S.
Bankasi (bank)  (insurance)
2  Tiurkiye  Emlak Bankasi  1  Insaat ve Imar A.S.
(bank)  (construction)
3  Thrkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.
(bank)
4  Denizcilik Bankasi T.A.S.
(bank)
5  Turkiye Seluloz ve Kagit
Fabrikalari  A.S. (paper and
pulp)
7  Tikrkiye  Cimento ve Toprak  1  Adiyaman Cimento Sanayi
Sanayi T.A.S. (cement  T.A.S. (cement  plant)
holding)  2  Bartin Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement  plant)
3  Corum Cimento Sanayi
T.A.S. (cement  plant)
4  Elazig Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement plant)
5  Ergani  Cimento  San.y:i
T.A.S.  (cement  plant)
6  Gaziantep  Cimento  Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement plant)
7  Kars Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement plant)
8  Siirt Kurtalan Cimento
Sanayii T.A.S. (cement
plant)
9  Ladik Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S.  (cement  plant)
10 Sivas Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement  plant)
11  Askale  Cimento  Sanayii
T.A.S.  (cement  plant)
12  Sanliurfa  Cimento  Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement  plant)
13 Trabzon Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement  plant)
14 Van Cimento Sanayii
T.A.S. (cement  plant)
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17 Bozfiy{kk  Seramik Sanayii
T.A.S.  (ceramics)
18 Filyos Ates Tuglasi
Sanayii T.A.S.
(refractory  bricks)
19 Konya Krom Magnezit
Sanayii T.A.S.(chrome,
magnesite plant)
20 Yarimca Porselen Sanayii
T.A.S. (china plant)
8  Tfirkiye  Demir ve Celik  1  Gerede Celik
Isletmeleri (iron  and steel)  Konstruksiyon  ve Techizat
Fab. San. ve Tic. A.S.
(GERKONSAN) (steel
construction)
9  Etibank (banking  and mining  1  Karadeniz Bakir
holding)  Isletmeleri  A.S. (copper)
2  Cinko Kursun Metal Sanayi
A.S.  (CINKUR)  (zinc)
10 Thrkiye Petrolleri  A.0.  1  Petrol Ofisi A.S.
(T.P.A.0) (petroleum  (petroleum distribution)
holding)  2  Deniz Isletmeciligi  ve
Tankerciligi A.S.
(shipping)
3  Tfirkiye  Petrol
Rafinerileri A.S.
(refineries)
4  Boru Hatlari ile Petrol
Tasima A.S. (pipelines)
5  Istanbul  Guibre  Sanayii
A.S. (fertilizer)
11 Tilrkiye  Gaibre  Sanayii  A.S.  1  Kiitahya  Guibre  Sanayii
(fertilizer  holding)  A.S. (fertilizer)
2  Samsun Gfibre  Sanayii A.S.
(fertilizer)
3  Gemlik Guibre  Sanayii A.S.
(fertilizer)
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12 Thrkiye Taskomuru Kurumu
(hard coal)
13 Devlet Malzeme Ofisi (state
supplies and equipment
office)
14 Tuirkiye  Seker Fabrikalari
A.S. (sugar factories)
15 Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi
Kurumu (machinery  and
chemical industry)
16 Agir Sanayi ve Otomotiv  I  Takim Tezgahlari San. ve
Kurumu (ASOK) (heavy  Tic. A.S. (metal  works)
industry and automotive)  2  Thirk  Motor Sanayii ve
Tic. A.S. (engines)
3  Asil Celik Sanayii ve
Tic. A.S. (steel)
17 Tiurkiye  Komur Isletmeleri
Kuru.- (lignite)
18 Et ve Balik Kurumu (meat  and
fish)
19 Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi  1  Aksaray Azmi Milli T.A.S.
(soil  products office)
20 Turkiye Sfit  Endustrisi
Kurimu (dairy  products)
21 Yem Sanayii T.A.S. (feed
stuff)
22 Thrkiye Zirai Donatim Kurumu
(agricultural  equipment)
23 Orman Uruinleri  Sanayii
Kurumu (forestry  products)
24 Turkiye Gemi Sanayii A.S.
(ship  building)
25 Turkiye Denizcilik  1  D.B. Deniz Nakliyati




1  Ttrkiye Elektrik Kurumu  1  Turkiye Elektromekanik
(electricity  board)  San. A.S. (TENSAN)
(electrical  machinery)
2  Thrkiye C*^.riyeti  Devlet  1  Turkiye Vagon Sanayii
Demir Yollari (rail  roads)  A.S. (railroad cars)
2  Turkiye Lokomotif ve
Motor San. A.S.
(locomotives  and engines)
3  Tfirkiye  Demiryollari
Makinalari San. A.S.
(railway  machinery)
3  Tuirkiye  Cumhuriyeti Posta,
Telgraf ve Telefon Isletmesi
Genel Mudurlugu '-st,
telegraph, telephkone  and
broadcasting)
4  Devlet Hava Meydanlari  1  Havaalanlari ve Yer
Isletmesi  Genel Mud.  Hizmetleri A.S. (airport
(airports)  and ground services)
5  Tiurk  Hava Yollari Anonim
Ortakligi (air line)
6  Cay Isletmeleri Genel Mud.
(tea)
7  Tfitfin,  Tiitiin  Mamulleri, Tuz
ye Alkol Isletmeleri  Gen.
Mud. (TEKEL) (tobacco  and
alcoholic beverages)




LIST  OF  STATE  ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES  AND MINORITY  SHARE HOLDINGS
TRANSFERRED TO  THE  PUBLIC  PARTNERSHIP ADMINISTRATION
X OF  GOVERNMENT  PRJVATIZATION
COMPANY  FIELD  OWNERSHIP  BUYER  (X) SHARE
I.  SEEs
1.  PETKIM  PETRO KIMYA HOLDING A.S.  Petrochemicals  97.6  -
2.  SUMERBANK  HOLDING A.S.  Textiles,  Banking  100.0  -
II.  SEE  Subsidiaries
3.  AFYON CIMENTO SANAYII  T.A.S.  Cement  99.6  SCF  51.0
4.  ANKARA  CIMENTO SANAYII  T.A.S.  Cement  99.3  SCF  99.3
5.  BALIKESIR  CIMENTO SANAYII  T.A.S.  Cement  98.3  SCF  98.3
6.  SOKE CIMENTO SANAYII T.A.S.  Cement  99.6  SCF  99.6
7.  T.AKYA CIMENTO SANAYII T.A.S,  Cement  99.9  SCF  99.6
8.  BOGAZICI HAVA TASIMACILIGI A.S.  Charter and Cargo  100.0  - LIQUIDATION
9.  USAS UCAK SERVISI A.S.  Catering  100.0  SAS  70.0
10. TURBAN TURIEZM  A.S.  Tourism  100.0  --
11. NIGDE CIMENTO SANAYII T,A.S.  Cement  99.8  --
12. ADANA KAGIT TORBA SANAYII A.S.  Paper Rack  S0.0  SCF  20.0
13. TESTAS T. ELECTRONIK SAN. T.A.S.  Electronic Equipment  94.3  - -
14. YOZGAT BIRA  Beer Production  100.0  - -
III. BANKS
15. CAYBANK  Banking  49.0  -
16. DENIZCILIK BANKASI  Banking  100.0  - -
17. ETIBANK  Banking  100.0  - -
18. TOBANK  Banking  96.9  - -
IV.  Participations
19. NETAS NORTHERN ELEK. TELEKO. A.S.  Telecommunication  49.0  - -
20. TELETAS TELEKO.ENDUSTRI T.A.S.  Telecommunication  22.0  PUBLIC  22.0
21. ANSAN T.A.S.  Soft Drinks  88.3  COCA-COLA  88.3
22. ARCELIK A.S.  Household Appliances  15.0  - -
23. BOLU CIMENTO SANAYII T.A.S.  Cement  35.3  - -
24. CELIK HALAT VE TEL. SANAYII A.S.  Steel Wires  29.2  - -
25. CUKUROVA ELEKTRIK A.S.  Electricity  19.0  - -
26. EREGLI DEMIR CELIK FAB. T.A.S.  Iron and Steel  48.9  - -
27. KEPEZ ELEKTRIK T.A.S.  Electricity  43.7  - -
28.  IEKTAS  TICARET TURK A.S.  Agricultural  Chemicals  5.0  - -
29. AROMA- BURSA MEYVE SU. GI. S.A.S.  Beverages  52.5  - -
30. BASF-SUMERBANK KIMYA SAN. A.S.  Chemicals  40.0  - -
31. CANAKKALE SERAMIK FAB. A.S.  Ceramics  11.3  - -
32. ADANA CIMENTO SANAYII T.A.S.  Cement  47.3  - -
33.  FRUKO-TAMEK  MEYVE SULARI SAN.  Agricultural Chemicals  36.0  - -
34. GIMA GIDA IHTIYAC MAD. T.A.S.  Supermarket Chain  50.0  - -
35. IPRAGAZ A.S.  Liquid Gas  49.3  - -
36. KONYA CIMENTO SANAYII A.S.  Cement  39.8  - -
37. MARDIN CIMENTO SANAYII T.A.S.  Cement  46.2  - -
38. MIGROS TURK T.A.S.  Supermarket Chain  42.3  - -
39. TAMEK-GIDA SAN. A.S.  Food and Beverages  31.0  - -
40. TOFAS OTO TICARET A.S.  Automobile  Marketing  39.0  - -
41. TOFAS TURK OTOMOBIL FAB. A.S.  AutomobiLes  23.1  - -
42. TURK KABLO A.O.  Cables  3S.0  - -
43. UNYE CIMEniTO  SANAYII T.A.S.  Cement  4n.2  - -
44. BANDIRMA YEM FAB. LTD.STI.  Animal Feeds  24.6  - -
45. KARS YEM FABRIKASI T.A.S.  Animal Feeds  32.0  - -
46.  SIVAS  YEM FABRIKASI A.S.  Animal Feeds  25.0  - -
47.  AKSARAY YEM FABRIKASI  A.S.  Animal  Feeds  40.0  H.OZOT-M.DEMIRAY  40.0
48.  CORUM  YEM FABRIKASI  A.S.  Animal  Feeds  30.0  PANKO BIRLIK  30.0
49.  ESKISEHIR  YEM FABRIKASI  A.S.  Animal  Feeds  45.0  ZEYTINOGLU HOL.  45.0
50.  KAYSERI  YEM FABRIKASI  A.S.  Animal  Feeds  13.3  54  SHARE HOLDERS  13.3
51. AEG-ETI ELEKTRIK ENDUSTRI A.S.  Electricity  20.0  - -
52. CESTAS CUKUROVA EL. SAN.T.A.S.  Electricity  2.2  - -
53. DITAS DGAN YE.PAR.IM.TEK.A.S.  Spare Parts  14.5  - -
54. GUNEY SANAYII VE TIC. ISLET.A.S.  Textiles  20.0  - -
55. TOROS GUBRE VE KIMYA END. A.S.  Fertilizers  25.0  - -
56. TOROS GUBRE VE ZIRAI IL.PA.A.S.  Medical Marketing  25.0  - -
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65Table  1.  Turkey  :  Key  Domestic  Economic  Indicators,  1980-90
1990
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 Target
National  Accounts  1/
Real  GNP growth  rate  (percent)  (1.1)  4.1  4.5  3.3  6.0  5.1  8.1  7.4  3.7  1.7  2/  5.7
As a  percent  of GNP
Consumption  84.1  82.0  81.8  83.5  83.5  81.1  78.2  76.1  73.9  77.4  76.3
Saving  (domestic)  15.9  18.0  18.2  16.5  16.5  18.9  21.8  23.9  26.1  22.6  23.7
Investment  21.4  21.5  20.3  20.7  19.3  20.8  24.4  25.4  24.0  21.7  22.8
Resource  gap  5.5  3.5  2.1  4.1  2.8  1.9  2.6  1.4  (2.1)  (0.9)  (0.9)
Private  consumption  71.9  71.3  71.1  73.3  74.5  72.5  69.3  67.0  65.1  66.8  64.5
Private  investment  9.9  8.3  8.4  9.4  9.6  9.4  11.1  12.0  13.0  12.5  12.8
Total  private  sector  81.8  79.6  79.4  82.7  84.1  81.9  80.3  79.0  78.1  79.4  77.3
Public  consumption  12.3  10.7  10.8  10.2  9.0  8.5  8.9  9.1  8.8  10.5  11.8
Public  investment  11.5  13.2  12.0  11.3  9.7  11.4  13.4  13.3  11.0  9.2  10.0
Total  public  sector  23.7  23.9  22.7  21 5  18.7  19.9  22.3  22.4  19.8  19.8  21.8
Prices
Average  annual  growth  rate
(percent,  realizations)
WPI  90.3  34.1  27  30.5  50.3  43.2  29.6  32.1  68.3  69.6
CPI  101.4  36.6  30.8  31.4  48.4  44.9  34.6  38.9  75.4  69.6
Public  sector  borrowing
requirement  (as  a  percent  of GNP)  1/  10.3  5.0  4.7  6.0  6.5  4.6  4.7  7.8  6.4  5.6  5.1
Money  Supply
Annual  growth  rate  (percent)
Ml  57.9  38.0  38.0  48.1  17.5  39.7  56.6  62.1  30.3  72.8
M2  66.3  85.0  56.7  29.8  58.0  55.5  A3.8  44.2  53.6  73.3
Foreign exchange deposits  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.111.2  173.0  115.4  146.1  84.5  44.4
M2X  66.3  85.0  56.7  29.8  64.9  63.2  49.7  56.3  59.4  67.0
I/ 1989  values  represent  estimates
21  SIS  estimate,  based  on  twelve-months  figures
Source  :  SPO  and  Central  BankTable  2.  Turkey  :  Key  External  Economic  Indicators,  1980-90
1990
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 Target
Balance  of  Paymonts
PercentaSe  change
Exports  (fob)  28.7  61.6  25.2  0.3  25.1  11.7  (8.1)  36.1  15.6  (1.3)  11.0
Imports  (fob)  56.0  14.0  (0.6)  4.4  16.1  8.7  (5.U)  27.1  1.1  16.5  10.2
As a  percent  of GNP
Exports  (fob)  5.0  8.0  11.0  11.5  14.7  15.5  13.0  15.2  16.9  14.6  13.8
Imports  (fob)  12.9  14.5  15.9  17.4  20.6  21.1  18.3  19.9  19.5  19.9  18.5
Trade  deficit  (7.9)  (6.6)  (4.9)  (5.8)  (5.9)  (5.6)  (5.3)  (4.7)  (2.5)  (5.2)  (4.8)
Current  account  balance  (5.8)  (3.3)  (1.8)  (3.8)  (2.9)  (1.9)  (2.5)  (1.2)  2.3  1.2  0.9
Interest  payments  2.0  2.4  2.9  2.9  3.2  3.3  3.7  3.5  4.0  3.6  3.3
Non-interest  current  account  balance  (3.9)  (0.8)  1.1  (0.8)  0.3  1.4  1.1  2.3  6.2  4.8  4.2
Capital  account  balance  1.2  1.5  0.5  1.7  0.1  2.0  3.6  2.8  (1.4)  1.0  (0.3)
Overall  balance  0.2  (0.0)  0.3  0.3  (0.1)  0.2  1.4  1.4  1.3  3.4  0.6
Reserves  (month  of  imports)  1.9  2.3  2.8  2.8  4.0  3.5  4.9  4.6  5.6  7.0
External  Debt
Millions  of  $
Total  outstanding  debt  (TD)  16,300 16,900 17,619 18,385 20,659 25,476 32,101 40,228 40,722 41,021
Debt  Service
Total  1,019  1,316  1,754  2,344  4,038  3,866  4,685  5,517  7,158  7,170
Principal  406  524  836  1,175  2,452  2,113  2,551  3,130  4,359  4,263
Interest  613  792  918  t,169  1,586  1,753  2,134  2,387  2,799  2,907
In  percentages
TD/GNP  27.9  28.7  32.8  35.9  41.2  47.9  55.1  59.1  57.8  51.0
TD/Exports  (Goods,  services  &
workers  remittances;  443.9  280.8  220.9  230.2  210.2  222.0  292.3  275.6  225.6  216.4
Debt  Service/Exports  (goods,
services  & workers  remittances)  27.8  21.9  22.0  29.3  41.1  33.7  42.7  37.8  39.7  37.8  17.4
Interest  Payments/Exports  (goods,
services  & workers  remittances)  31.0  24.0  19.6  18.9  16.1  15.3  19.4  16.4  15.5  15.3  13.0
Source  :  Central  Bank
67Table  3.  Turkey  :  Global  Public  Sector  Finances,  PSBR,  1980-89,  (in  percent  of GNP  in current  prices)
1989
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  Estimate
Central  Government  (3.9)  (1.7)  (2.3)  (3.6)  (5.3)  (2.9)  (3.6)  (4.5)  (4.0)  (3.8)
SEEs  (6.4)  (3.3)  (2.4)  (2.3)  (2.3)  (3.1)  (3.3)  (4.2)  (2.8)  (2.4)
Other  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  1.4  2.3  0.8  0.4  0.6
Total  public  sector  (PSBR)  (10.3)  (5.0)  (4.7)  (6.0)  (6.5)  (4.6)  (4.7)  (7.8)  (6.4)  (5.6)
Share  of  SEEs  in  PSBR
(percent)  62.3  65.7  51.6  39.2  35.4  67.4  70.2  53.8  43.8  42.9
Memorandum  item
GNP (TL,  Billion)  4,435  6,554  8,735 11,552 18,375 27,789 39,310 58,390  100,154  172,545
Source:  SPO
68Table 4. Turkey:  SEE Share in Total Public  Fixed Investment,  1980-90, (in  millions of Tt.,  at current prices)
1989  1990
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  Estimate  Target
SEEs Investments  283  411  536  774  923  1,721  2,424  3,341  5,174  7.055  10,125
Total Public  Investments  424  795  1,006  1,316 p  1,777  3,236  5,233  7,539  11,510  17,014  27,739
Sees Inv./Total Pub. Inv. (X)  66.6  51.7  53.3  58.8  51.9  53.2  46.3  44.3  45.0  41.5  36.5
Source :  SF0
69Table 5. Turkey  :  Distribution of Bank Credits by Users, 1980-89
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
A. In billions of TL
Public Administrations  200  279  283  377  583  1,070  1,302  2,100  3,057  5,179
SEEs  438  549  646  711  485  868  2,047  3,596  5,373  6,383
Private Corporations  and
Households  689  1,231  1,738  2,338  3,164  5,176  8,992  13,936  20,098  33,264
Other  0  1  1  1  0  1  14  28  140  146
Total  1,326  2,059  2,669  3,426  4,232  7,115  12,355  19,660  28,668  44,972
B. As a percent of total
Public Administrations  15.0  13.6  10 6  11.0  134  8  15.0  10.5  10.7  10.7  11.5
SEEs  33.0  26.6  24.2  20.7  11.5  12.2  16.6  18.3  18.7  14.2
Private  Corporations  and
Households  52.0  59.8  65.1  68.2  74.8  72.7  72.8  70.S  70.1  74.0
Other  0.n  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.3
Source  :  Central  Bank
70Table 6. Turkey  Profit and Loss Statements of SEEs, 1984-1990, (in  billions of TL)
1989  1990
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  Estim.  Target
Total Current Revenue  6,564  9,793  12,862  18,339  29,250  50,867  85,915
Sales of Goods and Services  6,201  9,297  12,122  16,893  27,408  48,916  83,609
Other  363  496  740  1,446  1,842  1,951  2,306
Total Current Expenditures  6,099  8,961  12,063  17,330  28,361  50,012  83,340
Wages and Salaries  719  973  1,283  2,031  3,075  7,352  13,002
Interest Payments  113  289  527  1,103  1,579  1,944  3,397
Depreciation  240  375  778  1,284  2,316  3,087  3,514
Frovisions 1/  42  62  396  341  1,530  1,501  2,201
Cost of Goods  and Services Sold  4,836  6,753  7,823  11,435  16,763  31,797  53,036
Other  149  509  1,256  1,136  3,098  4,331  8,190
Operating Surplus  465  832  799  1,009  889  855  2,575
Taxes Net of Subsidies  117  257  526  649  672  831  1,360
Post Tax Operating Surplus  348  575  273  360  217  24  1,215
Dividends Paid  0  0  0  0  70  253  185
Retained Earnings  348  575  273  360  147  (229)  1,030
Memorandum  Items
Internally  Generated Funds  642  1,013  1,448  2,005  3,993  4,545  6,833
Retained  Earnings  348  576  273  360  147  (229)  1,030
Depreciation  240  375  778  1,284  2,316  3,087  3,514
Provisions  42  62  396  341  1,530  1,501  2,201
Other  12  0  1  20  0  186  88
Operating  Surplus/Sales  of
Goods and Services (percent)  7.5  8.9  6.6  6.0  3.2  1.7  3.1
1/  Most of it provisions  for exchange rate differences
Sources  SPO
71Table 7. Turkey  : Financing Requirements of SEEs  1/, 1984-90, (in billions of TL)
1989  1990
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  Estimate  Target
Total Financing Requirements  1,605  2,319  3,105  5,057  7,758  10,161  15,489
Fixed Investment  917  1,708  2.406  3,316  5,130  6,977  9,956
Change  in stocks  545  536  580  1,351  2,074  2,375  4,008
Change  in fixed assets  113  32  29  315  482  667  1,308
Other  30  43  90  75  72  142  217
Internally generated funds  642  1,013  1,443  2,e0^  3,993  4,545  6,833
Financing requirement  963  1,306  1,662  3,052  3,765  5,616  8,656
Budgetary transfers  290  199  156  470  1,054  1,143  1,416
EBFs  173  248  159  0  0  376  623
Borrowing Requirement  501  859  1,345  2,583  2,711  4,098  6,618
Deferred payments, net  459  (14)  285  (5)  750  2,895  7,897
Cash financing requirement  42  873  1,060  2,588  1,961  1,203  (1,279)
Change in cash balances  (142)  (171)  (502)  (268)  (492)  222  179
Securities and deposits  (2)  6  1  100  89  0  (1)
Domestic bank borrowing, net  (103)  609  674  1,474  665  247  (365)
Foreign borrowing, net  289  429  887  1,282  1,699  734  (1,092)
Memorandum Item
(as a percent of GNP)
Budgetary transfers  1.6  0.7  0.4  0.8  1.1  0.7  0.5
EBFs  0.9  0.9  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2
Borrowing Requirement  2.7  3.1  3.4  4.4  2.7  2.4  2.4
1/ Totals may not add up because of rounding
Sources :  SPO
72Table  8.  Turkey:  Monthly  Closing  Values  of  the  Istanbul
Stock  Exchange  Index,  1986-90
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
January  100  217  858  380  3,641
February  120  261  721  487  3.516
March  116  246  635  466  3,294
April  112  269  554  534  3,308
May  115  395  553  654  3,971
June  115  446  469  796
July  122  1,021  493  701
August  139  1.149  2/  428  876
September  147  1,029  455  1.475
October  150  786  404  1,559
November  160  891  406  1,542
December  171  673  374  2,218
1/  Peaking  at  1,332
Source:  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange  and  Economic  Bulletin
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